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This kind of thing does not make for good business, it does not make for good
counselling, and it does not make for certainty. It means that you never know
where you are, and it does a very bad thing to the law indeed. The bad thing
that it does to the law is to lead to precedent after precedent in which lan-
guage is held not to mean what it says and indeed what its plain purpose was,
and that upsets everything for everybody in all future litigation.t
I. INTRODUCTION
Whatever may be said of the lack of certainty, stability, and
predictability in many areas of the law, chaos rarely is discovered.
Unfortunately, we have now reached that point in matters involv-
ing attempts by innumerable buyers and sellers to make contracts
through an exchange of printed forms. Because printed forms will
continue to be the written evidence of the overwhelming majority
* University Distinguished Service Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. I
completed this article during my time as Dean and Professor of Law at the Villanova Uni-
versity School of Law. I wish to thank my research assistant, Margaret A. McCausland, for
her assistance in the preparation of this article. I also wish to thank my Villanova colleague,
Professor Lewis Becker, for his critical evaluation of the manuscript.
t Statement of Karl Llewellyn, 1 State of New York, 1954 Revision Commission Re-
port, Hearings on the Uniform Commercial Code 114 (178).
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of attempted contracts in America,' this chaos threatens the insti-
tution of contract in our society. There should be no doubt that
"chaos" is an accurate characterization of the state of the law in
the "battle of the forms" arena. Courts and commentators have
disagreed on the proper application, interpretation, and construc-
tion of the statute governing contracts for the sales of goods, sec-
tion 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code.2 Courts have been in-
consistent and devoid of intellectual acuity in attempting to apply
2-207. Fair results in these cases often have been the product of
sheer coincidence, and many litigants have not been fortunate.3
The challenge of judicial elaboration that Karl Llewellyn created
in this section of Article 2 has not been approached.4
1. Professor W. David Slawson suggests that standard forms are probably the written
evidence of the contract in up to 99% of all contracts. Slawson, Standard Form Contracts
and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REv. 529, 529 (1971).
2. Section 2-207 provides:
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even though it states
terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is
expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the con-
tract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given within
a reasonable time after notice of them is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is suffi-
cient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do not other-
wise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of
those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplemen-
tary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.
U.C.C. § 2-207 (1978).
3. Professor Thatcher states:
Although many courts have managed to achieve viscerally satisfying results in applying
the statute, this has been done in spite of the curious statutory wording, not because of
it. Strained and manipulative interpretations of Section 2-207 indicate a need to supply
commercial parties with a revised statute that does not require fine tuning by repeated
judicial recourse to covert tools.
Thatcher, Battle of the Forms: Solution by Revision of Section 2-207, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 237,
240-41 (1984).
4. Article 2 is singular in its emphasis upon purposive interpretation and construction.
This emphasis is not remarkable in light of the jurisprudential proclivities of Karl Llewel-
lyn, Article 2's principal draftsman. "A piece of legislation, like any other rule of law, is, of
course, meaningless without reason and purpose." K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 228 (1962).
"[A] statute must at need be implemented to effect its purpose by going far beyond its
text." Llewellyn, The Modern Approach to Counseling and Advocacy-Especially in Com-
mercial Transactions, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 181 (1946). There has never been another
statute that so expressly relies upon judicial elaboration, analogy, and fidelity to its under-
lying purposes as Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Article 2 may be viewed as a
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Because there is no conventional wisdom concerning 2-207, no
recognized scholarship can be relied on.5 In their well-known com-
mercial law text, Professors White and Summers express unusually
candid disagreement on the proper interpretation and construction
of 2-207.8 Moreover, neither author is particularly pleased with his
view and each would prefer that the statute be redrafted. The stat-
ute itself is not merely a "murky bit of prose."' 7 It is riddled with
angular phraseology and features a subsection which was tacked on
belatedly without the aid of the statute's principal draftsman. In
the view of one of commercial law's giants, that added subsection
converted a troublesome statute into a "disaster."" Resorting to
set of common law guidelines providing a context through which courts may mold and
remold what a Comment to Article 1 calls a "semi-permanent" piece of legislation into a
body of merchant law which reacts effectively to the needs of commercial society. Article 2
can be understood only as a prism, with each section representing one facet of that prism.
See Murray, The Article 2 Prism: The Underlying Philosophy of Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 2 (1981) [hereinafter Murray, The Article 2 Prism];
see also Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27
STAN. L. REV. 621 (1975); McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial
Code: Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 795 (1978); infra note 80.
5. I do not mean to say that there have been no thoughtful contributions to a better
understanding of 2-207. See, e.g., Baird & Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of
the Forms: Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217 (1982); Barron & Dunfee, Two
Decades of 2-207: Review, Reflection and Revision, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 171 (1975); Duesen-
berg, Contract Creation: The Continuing Struggle with Additional and Different Terms
Under Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-207, 34 Bus. LAW. 1477 (1979); Murray, Section
2-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Another Word About Incipient Unconscionability,
39 U. PITT. L. REV. 597 (1978) [hereinafter Murray, Incipient Unconscionability]; Murray,
Intention Over Terms: An Exploration of U.C.C. 2-207 and New Section 60, Restatement
of Contracts, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 317 (1969) [hereinafter Murray, Intention Over Terms];
Shanker, Contract by Disagreement!? (Reflections of U.C.C. 2-207), 81 COM. L. J. 453 (1976);
Taylor, U.C.C. Section 2-207: An Integration of Legal Abstractions and Transactional Re-
ality, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 417 (1977); Thatcher, supra note 3; Travalio, Clearing the Air After
the Battle: Reconciling Fairness and Efficiency in a Formal Approach to U.C.C. Section 2-
207, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 327 (1983).
6. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 27-31 (2d ed. 1980).
7. Southwest Eng'g Co. v. Martin Tractor Co., 205 Kan. 684, 694, 473 P.2d 18, 25
(1970); see also Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1962)
("The statute is not too happily drafted."); Ebasco Servs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power &
Light Co., 460 F. Supp. 163, 205 (E.D. Pa. 1978) ("[an] enigmatic section of the Code"); R.
DEUSENBERG & L. KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS, 3 BENDER'S U.C.C. SERVICE, § 3.02 1986
(2-207 is "one of the most important, subtle, and difficult in the entire Code, and well it may
be said that the product as it finally reads is not altogether satisfactory.")
8. In a letter to Professor Robert Summers, Professor Grant Gilmore made the follow-
ing statement regarding section 2-207:
The 1952 version of 2-207 was bad enough . . . but the addition of subsection (3),
without the slightest explanation of how it was supposed to mesh with (1) and (2),
turned the section into a complete disaster. ...
My principal quarrel with your discussion of 2-207-and all the other discussions I
have read-is that you treat the section much too respectfully-as if it had sprung, all
1310 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1307
the Official Comments9 accompanying 2-207 is something akin to a
metaphysical experience until one realizes that the creators of the
Comments were as confused as all others who have attempted to
deal with the section since its enactment. Amendments to the
Comments, designed to patch the section where it did not work,
have succeeded only in exacerbating the confusion. The practicing
bar always has been wary of 2-207's charms, 10 and the academic
community has retreated more than substantially from its initial
high praise of the section.1 Demands for the abolition of 2-207 and
a new start are mounting, 12 and suggested substitutions in the
of the piece, like Minerva from the brow of Jove. The truth is that it was a miserable,
bungled, patched-up job-both text and Comment-to which various
hands-Llewellyn, Honnold, Braucher and my anonymous hack-contributed at vari-
ous points, each acting independently of the others (like the blind men and the ele-
phant). It strikes me as ludicrous to pretend that the section can, or should, be con-
strued as an integrated whole in light of what "the draftsmen" "intended". (I might
note that, when subsection (3) was added, Llewellyn had ceased to have anything to do
with the project).
Letter from Professor Grant Gilmore to Professor Robert Summers, reproduced in R. SPEI-
DEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WrTE, COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 54-55 (3d ed. 1981).
9. Although many courts have relied on the Comments in construing and applying
particular Code sections, the Comments have not been enacted into law. Therefore,
although the Comments may be useful in determining what the drafters intended in a par-
ticular Code section, when a conflict between the Code's language and a Comment exists,
the Code must control. Murray, The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 735, 736 n.10 (1982) [hereinafter Murray,
Standardized Agreement].
10. In a statement to a continuing legal education audience, Professor Grant Gilmore
said:
[O]ne of the problems in this field, which has always been the delight of law professors
...is the so-called battle of the forms where seller and buyer, each dedicated to his
own brand of insanity, exchange forms which have nothing. . . to do with each other
and then ask counsel, "Well, where are we?" That was a problem that Professor Llew-
ellyn dearly loved, and he put in a long section in Article 2 which has been, generally,
hailed by the academic community as nothing less than Magna Carta and, as far as I
can tell, generally hailed by members of the.., bar as probably the end of civilization
as we know it.
Coogan, Dunn, Farnsworth, Gilmore, Hogan, Kripke, Leary & Sachse, Advanced ALI-ABA
Course of Study on Banking and Secured Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, Transcript at 108 (1968).
11. Id.
12. A member of the ABA Committee on the Uniform Commercial Code, Mr. Ronald
J. Thomas, Assistant General Counsel of Burndy Corporation, Norwalk, Connecticut
pleaded in exasperation:
I recommend that we eliminate Section 2-207 and start from scratch to construct a law
that is clear and comprehensible to lawyers, judges and laymen. I believe, and I do not
say this lightly, that we could encourage no greater replacement in the U.C.C. [than] by
throwing out 2-207 and starting again.
Duesenberg, supra note 5, at 1477. "Because Section 2-207 has too often been an impedi-
ment to the effectuation of the underlying purposes and policies of the Code, it is overdue
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literature are not difficult to discover.'3 Some had hoped that the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, which appeared long after the
enactment of 2-207 throughout the country, would provide elabo-
ration and guidance concerning the entire standardized agreement
phenomenon, including the "battle of the forms." Instead, the Re-
statement is unfortunately counterproductive. 4
Bringing order from the current chaos of 2-207 through the
judicial process may not be possible. The statute may be fatally
flawed. Before reform of any kind can be successful, understanding
the purposes of 2-207 as a species of the purposes of Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code is essential. This Article first will
explore those purposes. In doing so, it will confront the highly con-
troversial problems faced in interpreting and construing 2-207. The
Article then will reexamine the section's drafting history, case law,
and scholarship to provide workable analyses of the counter-offer
riddle and the puzzle over different versus additional terms.
Resolving these well-known problems leaves the final enigma,
which has not been understood, much less confronted. Finally, the
denouement is discovered, through understanding the normative
assumptions of 2-207 as facets of the normative assumptions of the
Article 2 prism,'5 to promote fidelity to the underlying philosophy
of Article 2 in the particular context of the inevitable "battle of the
forms."
II. THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 2-207 WITHIN ARTICLE 2
The Article 2 revolution is predicated upon a more precise and
fair identification of the parties' factual bargains.'" The emphasis
for an overhaul." Thatcher, supra note 3, at 241; see also infra note 13.
13. See, e.g., Baird & Weisberg, supra note 5, at 1260-61; Barron & Dunfee, supra
note 5, at 206-07; Kaufman, The Scientific Method in Legal Thought: Legal Realism and
the Fourteen Principles of Justice, 12 ST. MARY'S L. J. 77, 81-82 n.20 (1980); Kove, "The
Battle of the Forms": A Proposal to Revise Section 2-2-207, 3 U.C.C. L.J. 7, 11-12 (1970);
Shaw, U.C.C. § 2-207: Two Alternative Proposals for Change, 13 AM. Bus. L.J. 185 (1975);
Thatcher, supra note 3, at 245-54.
14. See Murray, The Standardized Agreement, supra note 9, at 744-61.
15. See Murray, The Article 2 Prism, supra note 4, at 2.
16. R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAw 677 (3d ed.
1981) (quoting Murray, The Realism of Behaviorism Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
51 OIL L. REv. 269, 297 (1972)).
In testimony before the New York Law Revision Commission, Karl Llewellyn made it
clear that the changes he contemplated would be revolutionary:
In the third paragraph on page 2 it is stated that the Code "does not purport to
change the substantive law of this State except in a few particulars." But if there is one
thing which the Code does undertake to do, it is to remake the sales law of New York
State vigorously and over the whole field in order that the law may be made to con-
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is upon the "agreement" of the parties, which is defined as "the
bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language, or by im-
plication from other circumstances including course of dealing, or
usage of trade or course of performance . . . ." The discovery of
this factual bargain must be unfettered by the "technical"18 con-
straints of classical contract law. As heirs to the Article 2 revolu-
tion, we are particularly interested in identifying the "commercial
understanding"' 9 of the parties, and we will recognize a closed deal
if the parties manifest their intention that it should be closed.2
form to commercial practice, and may be read and make sense. It is beyond my under-
standing how anybody can either read the Article (knowing the present law) or can
read the comments on the Article (even though he does not know the present law), or
can read any of the literature about the Article or can criticize, for instance, the Stat-
ute of Frauds section, and still urge upon your Honorable Commission that the "Code
does not purport to change the substantive law of sales in New York except in a few
particulars." The changes are, in fact, deep, wide, vital. And they are utterly needed in
order to produce intelligent and workable commercial law. Miss Mentschikoff's com-
ments in your final session are peculiarly in point: The present law "works" by being
ignored by the decent business man.
1 State of New York, 1954 Law Revision Commission Report, Hearings on the Uniform
Commercial Code 49 (113) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter 1954 Law Revision Commis-
ion Hearings].
In emasculating the old Sales Act concept of title, the first comment in Article 2
(§ 2-101) suggests this pervasive philosophy:
The legal consequences [in Article 2] are stated as following directly from the con-
tract and action taken under it without resorting to the idea of when property or title
passed or was to pass as being the determining factor. The purpose is to avoid making
practical issues between practical men turn upon the location of an intangible some-
thing, the passing of which no man can prove by evidence and to substitute for such
abstractions proof of words and actions of a tangible character.
U.C.C. § 2-101 comment 1 (1978).
17. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1978) (emphasis added).
18. For examples of the antitechnical nature of Article 2, see id. § 2-204(3) ("Even
though one or more terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if
the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for
giving an appropriate remedy."); id. § 2-206 Comment 1 ("Formal technical rules as to
acceptance, such as requiring that telegraphic offers be accepted by telegraphic acceptance,
etc., are rejected . . . . "); id. § 2-209(1) ("An agreement modifying a contract within this
Article needs no consideration to be binding."); id. § 2-209(1) Comment 1 ("This section
seeks to protect and make effective all necessary and desirable modifications of sales con-
tracts without regard to the technicalities which at present hamper such adjustments."). See
also Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971). In Columbia Nitro-
gen the court required the implication of trade usage and prior course of dealing to deter-
mine the factual bargain of the parties. "Faithful adherence to this mandate reflects the
reality of the marketplace and avoids the overly legalistic interpretations which the Code
seeks to abolish." Id. at 10. "Indeed, the Code's official commentator urges that overly sim-
plistic and overly legalistic interpretation of a contract should be shunned." Id. at 11.
19. U.C.C. § 2-207 Comment 2 states in part: "Under this Article a proposed deal
which in commercial understanding has in fact been closed is recognized as a contract."
20. Id.
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We will not be troubled by missing terms as long as we can dis-
cover an intention to be bound21 and a reasonable basis to afford a
remedy. 22 We will not worry about the precise time of contract for-
mation,2 3 and we will sanction any reasonable manner of accept-
ance in any reasonable medium. 24 The parties may vary the terms
of the statute by their factual bargain25 in all but a few cases in
which the failure to prohibit variance would be absurd.2"
The Article 2 revolution further demands that every aspect of
every transaction will assume the standard of good faith, which, in
the case of merchants, includes commercial reasonableness. That
standard is one of the normative assumptions of Article 2 that the
parties cannot change by factual bargain. Our task is to approxi-
mate, as closely as the objective evidence permits, the "true under-
standing" 28 of the parties. No matter how complete and final the
written evidence of the deal may be,29 notions of "plain meaning"
interpretations 0 or refusals to consider trade usage, 1 course of
dealing,3 2 and course of performance3 3 will be rejected to permit
21. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1978).
22. Id.
23. U.C.C. § 2-204(2) (1978).
24. U.C.C. § 2-206(1)(a) (1978).
25. U.C.C. § 1-102(3) (1978).
26. See comment 2 to § 1-102, which, inter alia, suggests that even though nothing
explicitly prohibits varying the statute of frauds, a fair reading of the Code would prohibit
any variance, for to do otherwise would render the statute absurd.
The same analysis would apply to an attempt to vary the good faith and unconscion-
ability policies of Article 2. See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), 2-103(1)(b), 2-302 (1978).
27. U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b) (1978); see also id. § 1-201(19). The definition of good faith
for all parties, merchants and nonmerchants, is "honesty in fact in the conduct or trans-
action concerned." Id.
28. U.C.C. § 2-202 comment 2 (1978).
29. Id. § 2-202(a). For an elaboration of the U.C.C. parol evidence approach and the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) approach, see Murray, The Parol Evidence Process and Standard-
ized Agreements Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1342
(1975).
30. Id. § 2-202 comment 1(b), (c).
31. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) provides:
A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regularity of
observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be
observed with respect to the transaction in question. The existence and scope of such a
usage are to be proved as facts. If it is established that such a usage is embodied in a
written trade code or similar writing the interpretation of the writing is for the court.
32. U.C.C. § 1-205(1) provides: "A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct
between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing
a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct."
33. U.C.C. § 2-208 provides:
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for performance by either
party with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection
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discovery of the parties' agreement. If the parties reasonably be-
lieve that they have modified their deal, and that they did so in
good faith, we will not insist upon a technical requirement to en-
force the modification. 4 Because the parties should be permitted
to modify their factual bargain without technical interference,
their course of performance not only will provide the strongest evi-
dence of their contract's intended meaning; 5 it also will operate to
overcome their previously expressed terms.3 6
Unfair surprise37 and oppression' 8 are incongruous with Arti-
cle 2's good faith standard. Therefore, the "total legal obligation
which results from the parties' agreement [their contract]" 9 will
not include any oppressive terms. The statute includes safeguards
against oppression in particularly tempting instances, ° but
mechanical formalistic compliance with safeguard technicalities
should not be used to frustrate the overriding standards of good
faith and conscionability.41 Therefore, the factual bargain that we
to it by the other, any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objec-
tion shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the agreement.
(2) The express terms of the agreement and any such course of performance, as well as
any course of dealing and usage of trade, shall be construed whenever reasonable as
consistent with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable, express terms
shall control course of performance and course of performance shall control both course
of dealing and usage of trade (Section 1-205).
(3) Subject to the provisions of the next section on modification and waiver, such
course of performance shall be relevant to show a waiver or modification of any term
inconsistent with such course of performance.
34. U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (1978).
35. Id. § 2-208(2).
36. Id. §§ 2-208(3), -209; see also supra note 18.
37. U.C.C. §§ 2-207 comment 4, 2-302 comment 1 (1978).
38. Id.
39. U.C.C. § 1-201(11) (1978).
40. See, e.g., id. § 2-205 (indicating that when the printed form is supplied by the
offeree, any assurance that the offer will become a firm offer must be separately signed by
the offeror who may not have noticed it). A similar safeguard is found in 2-209(2). Section
2-316(2) contains a conspicuousness requirement, as well as the requirement that the term
"merchantability" must be used in order to disclaim the implied warranty of
merchantability. See also U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (expressing the conscionability limitation as a
safeguard, rather than simply having courts apply it pursuant to the general conscionability
standard of 2-302).
These examples of conscious adversion to overreaching are designed as threshold safe-
guards against unconscionable results. Consider, for example, comment 4 to 2-205, which,
after explaining the purpose of the separate authentication required when the offeree sup-
plies a form, adds: "Section 2-302 may operate, however, to prevent an unconscionable
result which otherwise would flow from other terms appearing in the form." U.C.C. § 2-205
comment 4 (1978).
41. Commentators have disagreed on whether a disclaimer of warranty which meets all
of the requirements of 2-316(2) may still be unconscionable. For an affirmative answer, see
1314
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will recognize as the total legal obligation of the parties-their con-
tract-will be the factual bargain that they, in good faith, reasona-
bly understand, regardless of the written evidence of their deal.
The contract between the parties will be the contract they thought
they were making, including terms they reasonably expect,
whether or not any writings evidencing their deal include such
terms. Their contract will not include terms they did not reasona-
bly expect, notwithstanding the inclusion of those terms in the
printed evidence of the deal.42
One of the most difficult applications of Article 2's philosophy
occurs in the typical merchant transaction involving printed forms.
Reasonable merchants use printed forms to make deals, and they
disregard certain printed provisions of those forms. Fulfilling the
underlying philosophy of Article 2 requires emphasizing their fac-
tual bargain and ignoring printed terms that a reasonable
merchant would not expect to find in the forms or would regard as
surplusage. The classic illustration of pre-Code, mechanical juris-
prudence in this context occurred in Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Col-
lender Co.43 In Poel a seller offered to sell a large quantity of rub-
ber to a buyer. In the blank spaces of the buyer's purchase order,
the buyer's agent inserted a description of the goods, the quantity,
the price, and the delivery term. These "dickered" 44 terms were
generally Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1 (1969). For a
negative view, see generally Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
42. For an elaboration of this concept, particularly in relation to the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts, see Murray, Standardized Agreement, supra note 9, at 780-81;
Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1173 (1983).
43. 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915).
44. See U.C.C. § 2-313 comments 1, 4 (1978). Karl Llewellyn suggested that "dickered
terms" were terms to which the parties have consciously adverted:
The answer, I suggest is this: Instead of thinking about "assent" to boiler plate clauses,
we can recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent at all. What has
in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered terms, and the broad type of
the transaction, and but one thing more. That one thing more is a blanket assent (not a
specific assent) to any not unreasonable or indecent terms the seller may have on his
form, which do not alter or eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms.
The fine print which has not been read has no business to cut under the reasonable
meaning of those dickered terms which constitute the dominant and only real expres-
sion of agreement, but much of it commonly belongs in.
K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmTON: DECIDING APPEALs 370 (1960).
In a report accompanying the original draft on unconscionability (now § 2-302, but then
numbered § 1-C), the following statement concerning "dickered terms" appears:
The Draft proceeds . . . upon the assumption-in-fact that choosing to bargain means
resorting to deliberate and intentional dicker about particular terms . . .. Deliberate
and intentional dickering is not shown in fact by a series of printed, unread clauses.
1986] 1315
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identical to the terms of the offer. The purchase order form also
contained printed clauses captioned, "Conditions on Which Above
Order is Given." One of the printed "conditions" read as follows:
"The acceptance of this order which in any event you must
promptly acknowledge will be considered by us as a guarantee on
your part of prompt delivery within the specified time."' 45 The
purchase order was dated April 4 and delivery was not to begin,
under the matching dickered terms, until the following January. In
January the buyer advised the seller that the employee who had
made the deal with the seller had no authority to effect the trans-
action. Because that defense did not augur success, the buyer's at-
torney scurried to the documents evidencing the transaction and
discovered the quoted printed provision from the purchase order.
The defendant-buyer argued that no contract existed because, by
the terms of the purchase order, the "acceptance" had to be ac-
knowledged promptly and the seller had not done so. The require-
ment of prompt acknowledgment turned what appeared to be a
definite expression of acceptance into a counter-offer pursuant to
the technical requirement that the acceptance must match exactly
the terms of the offer. Use of the "matching acceptance" or "mir-
ror image" rule permitted the "welsher"" to escape its contractual
obligation.
In a precocious effort the trial judge in Poel held that the par-
ties never intended the printed "conditions" to have any bearing
on the closed deal they assumed they had made. Had the New
York Court of Appeals adopted that view in 1915, Poel might have
been the landmark beginning of a judicial evolution of the concept
that Karl Llewellyn, more than three decades later, felt compelled
When such a series appears, .... the reasonableness of assuming both parties to have
chosen and agreed to incorporate such a set of clauses, in silence and without dickering,
depends upon whether the series of clauses presents the kind of balanced background
which parties can fairly, or indeed accurately, be thought to incorporate by silence.
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Report on and Second Draft
of a Revised Uniform Sales Act 24 (1941) reprinted in 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRrFTS
269, 304 (E. Kelly compiler 1984) (printed version) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter 1941
Proposed Report]. The entire quotation appears infra note 67.
There are two drafts of this Report, the 1941 Mimeo Draft, which is not widely avail-
able, and the 1941 printed version, which is available in many libraries. The Mimeo Draft
was identified in a letter from Karl Llewellyn to Professor Underhill Moore at the Yale Law
School as a "Second Draft of a Revised Sales Act, for the Committee's discussion. . . Sept.
19-22" (letter dated Sept. 5, 1941). The Mimeo Draft and the printed version differ in some
respects. References to the Report in this Article will specify either the Mimeo or printed
version.
45. Poel, 216 N.Y. at 316-17, 110 N.E. at 621 (emphasis added).
46. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 25.
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to introduce as part of the Uniform Commercial Code. Unfortu-
nately, the court of appeals reverted to the traditional, mechanistic
view that the response to the offer was to be read literally, printed
terms and all. The response in Poel did not match the terms of the
offer and was, therefore, a counter-offer creating no contractual ob-
ligation on the part of the buyer. It is clear beyond peradventure
that the buyer thought it was making a contract by sending the
purchase order. The purchaser's initial effort to escape its contrac-
tual obligations-arguing a lack of agency authority-did not in-
clude the argument that won the day in the New York Court of
Appeals. The seller easily could have "acknowledged" the "accept-
ance" in the purchase order, but saw no reason to do so because it
too assumed a contract had been formed. Finally, it is apparent
that the seller was the typical merchant; it did not read the
printed terms in a response to an offer any more extensively than
merchants read them today.'
47. Without a doubt, 2-207 is based on the assumption that merchants do not read or
understand the printed terms of their exchanged forms. Section 2-207's language appeared
radical because it found an operative acceptance of an offer even though the acceptance
contained different or additional terms.
Comment 1 to 2-207 notes: "Because the forms are oriented to the thinking of the
respective drafting parties, the terms contained in them often do not correspond. Often the
seller's form contains terms different from or additional to those set forth in the buyer's
form. Nevertheless, the parties proceed with the transaction." U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 1
(1978). Comment 2 emphasizes the "commercial understanding" of the parties, regardless of
differences in their exchanged forms. The original purpose of 2-207 was clearly set forth by
its principal draftsman, Karl Llewellyn. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
The only recent divergence from the assumption that merchants do not read printed
forms is found in Baird & Weisberg, supra note 5, at 1253-54: "Merchants, however, proba-
bly do look for, and pay attention to, preprinted terms that may prove important in the
transaction, including terms, such as warranty disclaimers, that turn up so frequently as the
subjects of reported battle of the forms litigation." As authority for this proposition, the
authors rely upon a British study by Beale & Dugdale, Contracts Between Businessmen:
Planning and the Use of Contractual Remedies, 2 BRrr. J.L. & Soc'y 45, 50 (1975), which
Baird and Weisberg initially characterize as "more recent empirical work [suggesting] that
parties are aware of the legal consequences of documents that differ." Baird & Weisberg,
supra note 5, at 1219 n.5. Later, however, they suggest that the Beale and Dugdale study
was "[b]ased on a survey of only 19 engineering manufacturers [and, therefore,] the study
must be regarded as merely suggestive." Id. at 1254 n.87. The Beale and Dugdale study was
"more recent" than the only significant American study which took a contrary position. See
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. Rv.
55, 59-62 (1963).
In Murray, Standardized Agreement, supra note 9, at 778-79 n.207, I reported my
experience with more than 5,000 purchasing agents, over a period of more than a decade,
and suggested that I never found one purchasing manager who read printed terms, and that,
when the purchasing agents were asked to explain a printed term from their own purchase
order forms, they could not do so. I understand that my sample is statistically significant. I
also can report that the typical purchasing agent has no understanding of the agreement
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The Poel case exemplified the "battle of the forms" problem,
which Karl Llewellyn "dearly loved. '48 During the New York Law
Revision Commission's study of the Uniform Commercial Code,
Llewellyn stated: "Those unhappy cases which find a condition
where no businessman would find one are carefully disapproved. 49
A reasonable seller in the Poel situation would not have discovered
any condition to the buyer's acceptance expressed in the purchase
order response to the seller's offer. A technical bar to finding a
contract led the court of appeals to find that no contract had been
made. The parties' factual bargain was ignored. The buyer was
permitted to operate in bad faith, and the result unfairly surprised
and oppressed the seller. Thus, the holding in Poel was diametri-
cally opposed to the underlying philosophy of what was to become
Article 2, and the case provided an excellent illustration of why
classical contract law needed to be modified substantially in the
new contract law Llewellyn contemplated. This new contract law
would insist upon recognizing the contract as reflecting the "com-
mercial understanding" 50 of the parties. If the parties reasonably
believed that their deal "has in fact been closed, '51 it would be
treated as having been legally closed, regardless of classical con-
tract law's technical shackles. The paradigm would be an offeree's
response that, to a reasonable merchant, appeared to be an accept-
ance even though the response contained terms that varied the
process (e.g., whether a "quote" is an offer), and does not identify his or her company as
offeror or offeree. Purchasing agents typically have no understanding of the writing require-
ment with respect to a contract for the sales of goods when the price is $500 or more. They
do not understand the concept of warranty (e.g., that the implied warranty of
merchantability may be highly preferable to the typical warranty of repair or replacement
preferred by the party they invariably call the "vendor" rather than the "seller"). They not
only have no understanding of disclaimers of warranties; they have no concept of buyer or
seller remedies or, a fortiori, consequential damages. They typically do not know what arbi-
tration is unless they have been involved in that procmss. Because purchasing agents make
the overwhelming majority of merchant-to-merchant contracts in America, the agents' level
of understanding of what they perceive to be the arcane science of law is a critical empirical
base underlying 2-207. At the same time, purchasing agents have at least a visceral reaction
to "indecent" terms, and they do have a clear sense of their "commercial understanding."
When informed of the "normative assumptions of Article 2," which are dealt with in the
final section of this Article, purchasing agents suggest an identity between those assump-
tions and their "commercial understanding." Whatever criticism may have been leveled at
Llewellyn for the lack of empirical verification underlying Article 2, this sample suggests
that his "hunches" were correct. See Murray, The Realism of Behaviorism Under the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 51 OR. L. REv. 269 (1972).
48. See supra note 10.
49. 1954 Law Revision Commission Hearings, supra note 16, at 55 (119).
50. U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 2 (1978).
51. Id.
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terms of the offer. Notwithstanding such variant terms, if a reason-
able offeror would view the response as an acceptance, it would be
an acceptance.
III. THE ORIGINAL STATUTORY SOLUTION
Karl Llewellyn proposed a statutory solution to the battle of
the forms that appeared radical, but, in comparison with subse-
quent drafts, was relatively simple. In keeping with his virtual ob-
session with emphasizing the purpose of the statute,52 Llewellyn
provided a preamble to 2-207, which was to become, with some re-
vision, subsection (1) in subsequent versions. The preamble found
an operative acceptance "[w]here either a definite and seasonable
expression of acceptance or a written confirmation which is sent
within a reasonable time states terms additional to those offered or
agreed upon .... 58
In addition to his concern that a deal which, according to a
reasonable commercial understanding, was closed should be
treated as closed, notwithstanding variant terms, Llewellyn was
even more concerned about the problem that arose when an oral
contract was confirmed by one or more printed forms containing
terms that varied the oral agreement.5 4 He criticized cases that dis-
regarded the oral agreement and concentrated exclusively on the
confirmations whenever one or both confirmations were inconsis-
52. The general importance of unearthing purpose in statutory construction cannot be
gainsaid. See Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1-57 (1975); see also supra note 4.
U.C.C. § 1-102 reads, in part: (1) "This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to
promote its underlying purposes and policies." U.C.C. § 1-102(1) (1978). Comment 1 reads in
part:
The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying purposes and poli-
cies. The text of each section should be read in the light of the purpose and policy of
the rule or principle in question, as also of the Act as a whole, and the application of
the language should be construed narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in conform-
ity with the purposes and policies involved.
Id. § 1-102 comment 1.
53. U.C.C. § 2-207 (May 1949 Draft), reprinted in 7 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
DRAFTS 85 (E. Kelly compiler 1984).
54. At the Law Revision Commission Hearings, Llewellyn stated:
Matter number 2 is more troublesome. In [sic] deals with the now hopelessly con-
fused situation presented when deals are made by phone or by shorthand message and
"confirmations" are sent on forms which reach beyond the dickered terms; or when an
"acceptance" occurs on "our standard form," and the like-often enough answered by
a varying "our standard form" from the other side. The "orthodox" law of offer,
counter-offer, and the like gives no satisfactory answer to this problem.
1954 Law Revision Commission Hearings, supra note 16, at 55-56 (119-20) (emphasis in
original).
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tent with the terms of the oral deal. Because the variant terms
contained in the confirmations were unrelated to the factual bar-
gain, it was crucial to Llewellyn that courts focus upon the parties'
true understanding and not be caught in a bramble bush of incon-
sistent terms. Thus, Llewellyn's proposed statutory language dealt
with both an expression of acceptance containing variant terms
and confirmations containing terms that varied the terms of the
oral agreement. If acceptances containing additional terms are per-
missible, the statutory language must direct the courts in dealing
with those additional terms. Llewellyn proposed the following:
(a) The additional terms are to be construed as proposal (sic) for modifica-
tion or addition; and
(b) between merchants the additional terms become part of the contract un-
less they materially alter it or notice of objection is given within a reasonable
time after they are received.55
If additional terms are mere proposals for modification, the origi-
nal offeror must accept those terms if he or she wants them to
become operative terms of the deal. If the parties are merchants,
however, any immaterial additional term becomes an operative
term unless the offeror objects to its inclusion. Material altera-
tions, by contract, are inoperative. This proposal constituted the
complete 2-207 in May 1949. A preamble and two subsections
would solve the problem of variant terms and place these situa-
tions squarely within the underlying philosophy of Article 2.
Commentators generally assume that "[tihe original drafts-
man of 2-207 designed it mainly to keep the welsher in the con-
tract.' '56 This statement may view Llewellyn's original intention
too narrowly in light of the underlying philosophy of Article 2.
While Llewellyn certainly had cases like Poel in mind when he
drafted his proposal, he must have realized that once courts are
statutorily directed to assume that certain terms are not to be
given operative effect, restricting that directive to cases factually
similar to Poet would be impossible. Llewellyn was certainly aware
of the importance of a change that would refuse operative effect to
certain terms in the writing evidencing a contract. At one point he
suggested that he regarded the section on* unconscionability "as
perhaps the most valuable section in the entire Code. ' ' 5 He ex-
plained the necessity of the section by criticizing lawyers who draft
55. U.C.C. § 2-207 (May 1949 Draft).
56. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 25 (Llewellyn had cases like Poel in
mind).
57. 1954 Law Revision Commission Hearings, supra note 16, at 57 (121).
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"to the absolute limit of what the law can conceivably bear,"58 and
then "the court kicks [the contract] over."59 Under the classical
theory, however, the courts used "covert tools"60 to prevent uncon-
scionable results. Llewellyn was concerned that the existing judi-
cial process lacked certainty, stability, and predictability. He be-
lieved that section 2-302 brought this process "out into the open,"
and that the section in essence said, "[W]hen it gets too stiff to
make sense, then the court may knock it out."6 ' He did not expect
that 2-302 alone would provide the necessary certainty, stability,
and predictability, for the section required case law development.
He attempted to overcome doubts about factual questions through
subsection (1) of 2-302,2 which allocates the determination of un-
conscionability to courts rather than juries. The result is "prece-
dent.""3 He then placed restraints on "the untutored imagination
of courts '64 by including subsection (2), which permits "all kinds
of [business] background to be presented to instruct the court."6 5
Consequently, 2-302 "greatly advance[d] certainty in a. . . most
baffling, most troubling, and almost unreckonable situation. 6 6 Sec-
tions 2-302 and 2-207 are premised upon the same theme: terms
that are reasonable in commercial understanding will remain oper-
ative; other terms will be "knocked out." The fundamental differ-
ence between the purpose of 2-302 and the purpose of 2-207, how-
ever, is exposed. The former deals with nullifying terms of a
contract because they unfairly surprise and oppress the party
58. Id. at 113 (177).
59. Id. at 114 (178).
60. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939), (reviewing 0. PRAUSNITZ,
THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW (1937)
("The net effect is unnecessary confusion and unpredictability, together with inadequate
remedy, and evil persisting that calls for remedy. Covert tools are never reliable tools."); see
also 1954 Law Revision Commission Hearings, supra note 16, at 114 (178) ("The clause is
perfectly clear and the court said, 'Had it been desired to provide such an unbelievable
thing, surely language could have been made clearer.' Then counsel redrafts, and they not
only say it twice as well, but they wind up saying, 'And we really mean it,' and the court
looks at it a second time and says, 'Had this been the kind of thing really intended to go
into an agreement, surely language could have been found,' . . ").
61. 1954 Law Revision Commission Hearings, supra note 16, at 114 (178).
62. If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the con-
tract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or
it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result. U.C.C. § 2-302(1); see also infra note 79.
63. 1954 Law Revision Commission Hearings, supra note 16, at 114 (178).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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against whom they would operate. On the other hand, 2-207
presents a threshold question: What are the terms of the contract?
If a party would not reasonably understand that certain terms
were included in the contract ab initio, they will not be included,
because their inclusion would unfairly surprise and oppress the
party against whom they would have operated. Section 2-207,
therefore, may be viewed as addressing incipient unconscionabil-
ity-its philosophy is identical to 2-302s.7
IV. THE COUNTER-OFFER RIDDLE
One of the most troublesome questions arising out of 2-207
concerns the interpretation and construction of the last proviso of
2-207(1): "unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on as-
sent to the additional or different terms." That language did not
appear in the statutory text of the 1949 version of 2-207. It did
appear, however, in slightly different terms, in a Comment to the
1949 draft: "unless the acceptance is made conditional on the ac-
67. See Murray, Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 5. The original drafting his-
tory of what was to become 2-302 (then numbered § 1-C) provides further support for the
suggestion of identity in the philosophy of sections 2-302.and 2-207. A report accompanying
the draft contained the following statement:
Balance in any background sought to be substituted
The Draft proceeds upon the assumption-in-policy that buyers and sellers ought
(within the limits of such rules as those on legality) to be free to bargain as they
choose. It proceeds upon the assumption-in-fact that choosing to bargain means resort-
ing to deliberate and intentional dicker about particular terms, producing the kind of
transaction known in law as an effective contract. Deliberate and intentional dickering
is not shown in fact by a series of printed, unread clauses. When such a series appears,
the position of the Draft is that the reasonableness of assuming both parties to have
chosen and agreed to incorporate such a set of clauses, in silence and without dickering,
depends upon whether the series of clauses presents the kind of balanced background
which parties can fairly, or indeed accurately, be thought to incorporate by silence.
1941 Proposed Report 24 (printed version); see also infra notes 238, 249-50.
In Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 90, 569 P.2d 751, 141 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1977), the
court said:
Section 2-207 is thus of a piece with other recent developments in contract law. Instead
of fastening upon abstract doctrinal concepts like offer and acceptance, section 2-207
looks to the actual dealing of the parties and gives legal effect to that conduct. Much as
adhesion contract analysis teaches us not to enforce contracts until we look behind the
facade of the formalistic standardized agreement in order to determine whether any
inequality of bargaining power between the parties renders contractual terms uncon-
scionable, or causes the contract to be interpreted against the more powerful party,
section 2-207 instructs us not to refuse to enforce contracts until we look below the
surface of the parties' disagreement as to contract terms and determine whether the
parties undertook to close their deal. Section 2-207 requires courts to put aside the
formal and academic stereotypes of traditional doctrine of offer and acceptance and to
analyze instead what really happens.
Id. at 100, 569 P.2d at 758, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 164 (emphasis in original).
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ceptance of the additional terms." 8 The Comment to the 1949
draft originated with Mr. B.D. Broeker of the Bethlehem Steel
Company, who requested a Comment clarifying subsection (1) to 2-
207.69 The Executive Secretary and Director of Research of the
New York Law Revision Commission, John W. MacDonald, que-
ried Karl Llewellyn regarding why the "unless" proviso was housed
in a Comment, rather than in the text of 2-207. Llewellyn ex-
plained: "That is supposed to be a comment on the first line of
subsection (1),. . .[A definite and seasonable expression of accept-
ance] .... We are attempting to say, whether we got it said or
not, that a document which said, 'This is an acceptance only if the
additional terms we state are taken by you' is not a definite and
seasonable expression of acceptance but is an expression of a
counter-offer."70 MacDonald was not satisfied: "Wouldn't it have
been fine, to put in the text, 'definite, unconditional and seasona-
ble' ?"71 Broeker answered: "That's right, but, as Professor Llewel-
lyn says, the text was final at that time and the comments weren't.
That is why that phrase got in the comments. 7 2 Llewellyn has-
tened to add: "If you said, 'unconditional and seasonable,' you
would simply incorporate the completely confused body of present
case law."173
Llewellyn's rejection of the term "unconditional" focuses upon
the major problem in the existing case law. He emphasized the im-
portance of "carefully" disapproving "[t]hose unhappy cases which
68. The terms "expressly" and "different" were added in later drafts. The revision
usually referred to as Supplement No. 1, January 1955, phrased the unless clause as follows:
"unless the acceptance is explicitly made conditional on assent of the offeror to any addi-
tional term." The unless clause applied to an offer "not accompanied by form clauses."
When a written offer was accompanied by form clauses, the draft phrased the unless clause
as follows: "unless. . .the expression of acceptance conspicuously makes its own operation
conditional on the offeror's agreement to any specified one of its form clauses or to all of
them." "Different" did not appear until the second revision, which is the current language
of 2-207.
69. 1954 Law Revision Commission Hearings, supra note 16, at 119 (183).
70. Id. at 117 (181). MacDonald replied: "But we don't find that in the text of the
statute." Id. Llewellyn countered: "It is found in the word 'acceptance' in the first line of
subsection (1). We don't see how that can be an expression of acceptance which says, 'This
is not an acceptance unless you take the terms that we put here in addition.'" Id. MacDon-
ald answered: "I see the way you are construing it,.... " Id. Mr. Broeker intervened to
inform MacDonald that Broeker had asked Llewellyn to insert it in a Comment "because
[he] wanted something in there to make clear that first line of (1) where it says it wasn't a
'definite and seasonable expression of acceptance.'" Id. at 119 (183).
71. Id. at 119 (183).
72. Id.
73. Id.
1986] 1323
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
find a condition where no businessman would find one. '74 Classical
theory would find such a condition in a response to an offer if the
response contained any additional terms. Therefore, if 2-207 were
to include "unconditional" along with "definite and seasonable," it
would invite courts to discover conditions in responses when no
businessman would find them. If, however, a reasonable business-
man would understand that the "acceptance" of an offer was con-
ditioned on the offeror's assent to the response's additional terms,
the response is not a definite and seasonable expression of accept-
ance ab initio. According to Llewellyn, it "is an expression of a
counter-offer. 75 Nothing indicates that this counter-offer would
operate in any fashion other than as a normal counter-offer. It
would reject the original offer and create a new power of accept-
ance in the original offeror.7 In addition, evidence tends to show
that those who dealt with 2-207 at this stage believed that the sec-
tion created a typical counter-offer. An expert for the Commission
provided the following commentary on 2-207:
Under subsection (1) [the former preamble], an expression of acceptance ad-
ding to or varying from the offer does not have the effect of an acceptance if
it is expressly conditioned upon assent to the new terms. In other words, if it
is expressly couched in terms of a counter-offer, it will have that effect."
This view strictly conformed with the Llewellyn view that an
"acceptance" that "mentions further terms, but not as an explicit
condition to acceptance. . . would still act as an acceptance be-
cause no businessman would find it a conditional acceptance
amounting to a counter-offer. The fundamental and dramatic
change in classical contract law that Llewellyn intended to effect
may be stated as follows: Under classical contract law, a response
varying the terms of the offer created an assumption that the of-
feree was making a counter-offer unless he made it very clear that
he was not making a counter-offer and that the variant terms were
mere suggestions not intended to interfere with the exercise of the
power of acceptance. Under the radical Llewellyn modification, the
reverse is true: variant terms in the response to an offer will be
treated as proposals for modification without any intent to inter-
74. Id. at 55 (119).
75. Id. at 117 (181).
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39 Comment a (1981).
77. 1 Law Revision Commission Report, (1955) State of New York, Study of the Uni-
form Commercial Code 392 (726) [hereinafter cited as 1955 Law Revision Commission
Report].
78. 1954 Law Revision Commission Hearings, supra note 16, at 55 (119).
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fere with the exercise of the power of acceptance unless the offeree
makes it very clear that the response is a counter-offer. Again, the
response must be "very clear" to a reasonable merchant-offeror. If
the test were otherwise-if courts interpreted the response in their
own light rather than in the illumination afforded by commercial
understanding-Llewellyn justifiably feared that no change would
be effected. Courts would discover a counter-offer if variant or ad-
ditional terms were found in the response to the offer.
Notwithstanding its radical departure from pre-Code assump-
tions, Llewellyn's concept is relatively simple. The reasonable of-
feror who receives a response that appears to be a definite expres-
sion of acceptance will not be frustrated by technical doctrines
that would have converted the response to a counter-offer under
classical contract law. The burden will be on the offeree to ascer-
tain that a reasonable offeror understands that the response is ex-
pressly conditional on the offeror's assent to variant terms. Before
the response will be treated as a counter-offer, a reasonable
merchant-offeror must understand it to be a counter-offer. If it is a
counter-offer, acceptance of the counter-offer will create a contract
on the terms proposed by the offeree. Neither the offeror nor the
offeree should be surprised unfairly. The recognized factual bar-
gain will be the bargain as understood by reasonable merchants, as
contrasted with an arrangement that results from procrustean no-
tions of classical contract law. A return to Lex Mercatoria pervades
this entire sequence as it pervades all of Article 2.79 Prior to Llew-
ellyn's changes, if the legalized agreement resembled the factual
bargain, the similarity was due to sheer coincidence. In the future,
the factual bargain would be the legal bargain-the contract.
79. Those who knew Llewellyn's views on commercial law were convinced that the
model he wished to follow was, essentially, the law merchant. A number of his contem-
poraries would attest to this belief that "Lord Mansfield had it right."
A comment attached to the original draft of the unconscionability section, 2-302 (then
section 1-C), emphasizes the importance of permitting such questions to be decided exclu-
sively by the court rather than by the jury. Llewellyn, however, would have preferred a
return to the merchants' jury.
Question for the court. The total estimate of the effect of a body of provisions, in terms
of balance, is a job for which a court is peculiarly fitted. The question of whether the
provisions fit the circumstances of a particular trade is one which a special merchants'
jury can best decide under Section 1-C. But the merchant runs some risk of accepting a
provision merely as it is written because it is so written; and he has little training in
sizing up a transaction from both ends at once, to reach a view of balance. As against
this stands the fact that the issue to be tried is the issue of balance; and given that
focus of attention, the merchants' jury would seem an adequate tribunal.
1941 Proposed Report (Mimeo Draft) § 1-C comment B(2) (emphasis in original).
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It is unlikely that Llewellyn recognized the severe problems
that courts would face in attempting to elaborate this relatively
simple concept. He had absolute confidence in the judicial creation
of a magnificent edifice of fidelity to factual bargains with the skel-
etal foundation of 2-207 as the driving force.80 Had he lived to wit-
ness the actual judicial development, his disappointment would
have been profound.
A. An Interim Solution
The difficulty in attempting to create a statutory solution that
includes all the necessary operative elements for dealing with bat-
tle of the forms problems is evidenced by what this Article shall
call the "interim draft," the 1954 revision of 2-207 officially known
as "Supplement No. L11 That draft expanded 2-207 to five sub-
80. Karl Llewellyn felt that the existing pre-Code law that related to additional or
varying clauses in printed forms was
[i]n a word. . confused and uncertain. Some improvement is to be hoped [for] from
the provision of Sec. 2-207(2) which allows minor additional terms to enter into the
contract without that express consent which (more frequently than not) never occurs.
What terms will be construed as "materially" altering the contract is . . . a question
for the court's determination.
1954 Law Revision Commission Hearings, supra note 16, at 56 (120).
Llewellyn was attempting to develop "precedent," and he regarded 2-207 as the basis
for judicial development in this area. He suggested that "[t]he Code represents a material
step towards greater reckonability than we now have" with respect to 2-207 matters. Id.
81. The text of the interim draft reads as follows:
Section 2-207. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.
(1) Where a contract for sale is concluded by word of mouth and terms additional
to or different from those of the agreement are included in the written confirmation of
one party or of each then the oral agreement controls. This provision is subject to the
statute of frauds (Section 2-201) and to the provisions on final written expression (Sec-
tion 2-202), and to the operation of subsection (6).
(2) Where a written offer is not accompanied by form clauses a seasonable and
definite expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even though it states terms
additional to those offered unless the acceptance is explicitly made conditional on
assent of the offeror to any additional term. Any additional term is to be read as a
proposal for addition to the contract.
(3) Where a written offer of one party is accompanied by form clauses prepared by
the other party the clauses are incorporated into the offer unless they are manifestly
unreasonable.
(4) When a written offer is accompanied by form clauses prepared by the offeror, a
definite and seasonable expression of acceptance operates as an acceptance even
though it contains form clauses additional to or at variance with those of the offer,
unless either
(a) the offer conspicuously makes its acceptance conditional on the offeree's
agreement to any specified one of its form clauses or to all of them; or
(b) the expression of acceptance conspicuously makes its own operation con-
ditional on the offeror's agreement to any specified one of its form clauses or to all
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sections. Subsections (4) and (5) are important for this analysis.
Subsection (4), which is the progenitor of the present statutory
language, provides that a written offer accompanied by form
clauses may be accepted even though the definite and seasonable
expression of acceptance contains additional or variant form
clauses. Subsections 4(a) and 4(b) contain two express exceptions
to this general rule. Under subsection 4(a) of the interim draft,
when the offer conspicuously limits acceptance to the form clauses
of the offer, a response containing additional or variant form
clauses would not constitute an acceptance. This result is consis-
tent with the intensified Code view that the offeror is master of the
offer and may restrict the power of acceptance in any fashion."2 A
faulty response-one containing additional or variant form
clauses-would not be a counter-offer. It simply would fail as an
acceptance. If the parties, having failed to form a contract, then
proceeded to perform-the seller shipped and the buyer accepted
the goods-a contract by conduct would be formed under subsec-
tion (5). The terms of that contract would be the terms upon
which the exchanged writings agreed, and any gaps would be filled
through supplementary Code provisions. This solution is plausible.
The parties have formed a contract, as evidenced by their conduct.
If the ineffective exchanged writings include matching terms, why
not insert these terms in the contract by conduct because they evi-
dence the parties' intent with respect to the terms?83
of them.
(5) Even though by reason of such conspicuous conditions as are described in sub-
section (4) a contract fails by reason of such exchange of writings, yet conduct by both
parties which recognizes the existence of an agreement about the subject matter is suf-
ficient to establish the fact of agreement. In such case the terms of the particular agree-
ment consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with
any supplementary terms incorporated under either the next subsection or any other
provisions of this Act.
(6) Between merchants an additional term which has not been the subject of spe-
cific negotiation and which in good faith is added to a written expression or confirma-
tion of acceptance becomes part of the contract unless it is at variance with the terms
of the offer or unless notification of objection has been given in advance or is given
within a reasonable time after notice of the additional term is received or unless the
additional term is manifestly unreasonable.
1955 Law Revision Commission Report, supra note 77, at 390-91 (724-25).
82. Murray, Contracts: A New Design for the Agreement Process, 53 CORNELL L. REy.
785, 787-88 (1968) [hereinafter Murray, A New Design].
83. Although this solution is plausible, a contrary argument exists. For example, the
seller might not have been willing to sell at the price the buyer offered if the seller was not
going to receive a disclaimer of warranties or exclusion of consequential damages. To say
that a party intended to sell at the same price regardless of the terms that would be in the
contract is arguably unfair to the party who loses favorable exclusionary terms.
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The problem arises with the second exception to the general
rule that a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance may
operate as an acceptance even though it contains additional or va-
riant terms. Under subsection 4(b), if an "acceptance" is conspicu-
ously8 4 conditioned on the offeror's agreement to any form clauses
in the acceptance, the "acceptance" would be a counter-offer.
Again, no contract would exist between the parties. If the parties
proceeded to perform as if they had a contract, however, a contract
by conduct would be created. As in the case of an offer conspicu-
ously limiting acceptance to the form clauses of the offer, the terms
of the contract by conduct formed following a counter-offer would
be the writings' matching terms with the gaps filled by Code provi-
sions. Unlike its application in subsection 4(a), this analysis is un-
sound as applied in subsection 4(b). It ignores the counter-offer. If
a response to an offer conditions acceptance on the offeror's agree-
ment to additional or variant terms in the response, it is unques-
tionably a counter-offer. A counter-offer is not only a rejection of
the offer; it is much more. "A counter-offer must be capable of be-
ing accepted; it carries negotiations on rather than breaking them
off. The termination of the power of acceptance by a counter-offer
merely carries out the usual understanding of bargainers that one
proposal is dropped when another is taken under consideration. 8 5
If an offeror reasonably understands the offeree's response as a
counter-offer, the offeror should understand that the offeree
shipped the goods with the intention of making a contract only on
the terms of the counter-offer. The interim draft's requirement
that the conditioning language in the response be conspicuous was
designed to make sure that the offeror would understand the re-
sponse as a counter-offer. Nothing indicates that the drafters in-
tended the counter-offer to be treated as a mere proposal by the
offeree to insert terms to which the offeror would have to assent
expressly. Indeed, the official analyst of the New York Law Revi-
sion Commission commented on both conditions-the offer limit-
ing acceptance and the conditional "acceptance" (counter-offer):
"[I]f an offer, or counter-offer, says in so many words that it must
be accepted 'as is,' then that limitation controls."86 But under the
interim draft, the limitation does not control when the counter-
84. A term or clause is "conspicuous" when it is written so that a reasonable person
against whom it is to operate ought to notice it. U.C.C. § 1-201(10). The term "conspicuous,"
however, was deleted from subsequent drafts.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39 comment a (1981).
86. 1955 Law Revision Commission Report, supra note 77, at 392 (726).
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offer is accepted by performance-acceptance of the goods. To em-
phasize this difficulty, consider the following example.
B sends a purchase order (offer) to S, who responds by send-
ing its acknowledgment form containing the following conspicuous
language on its face:
The terms of any contract must be the terms on this form rather than any
form you supplied. This is an express condition of our acceptance. Since you
are, apparently, in need of the goods described herein, we will ship immedi-
ately. It must be understood that your acceptance of the goods will constitute
acceptance of all of the terms of this form and any terms on your form which
conflict with the terms of this form will not be enforceable.
The acknowledgment form contains additional or variant
terms. If the buyer accepts the goods, under the interim draft,
would a contract be formed on the terms of the counter-offer, or
would the court recognize a contract by conduct and insert match-
ing terms from the exchanged writings and the Code's gap-filling
terms? Nothing in the interim draft or the discussion of that draft
indicates that the drafters considered this difficulty.
This situation worsens under the Second Revision, which
eventually became the current statutory language. Under the pre-
sent language of 2-207, an offer that expressly limits acceptance to
the terms of the offer should be viewed as the first of three opera-
tive alternatives"8 for dealing with "additional" terms in a response
that is otherwise a definite and seasonable expression of accept-
ance. There is no express provision in the current 2-207 that would
preclude an acceptance of an offer expressly limiting acceptance to
the terms of the offer if the response contains additional or differ-
ent terms. The absence of a specific provision akin to subsection
4(a) of the interim draft suggests two alternative interpretations.
First, the Code drafters may have intended to eliminate the
possibility of an offer that cannot be accepted by a response con-
taining different or additional terms, although they otherwise in-
sisted that the offeror is master of the offer and may limit the
power of acceptance in any fashion. This interpretation would re-
strict the effect of statements in the offer limiting acceptance to
the terms of the offer to excising any variant terms in the accept-
ance under 2-207(2)(a).
Second, although the current 2-207 does not deal expressly
with the situation, the drafters may have intended to continue the
power of an offer limiting acceptance to the terms of the offer to
87. See supra note 2.
88. See U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(a), (b), (c).
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preclude any acceptance if additional or different terms appear in
the response to the offer. One commentary suggests that the sec-
ond interpretation is correct, but warns that distinguishing these
interpretations of language "is subtle and not easily determined."' 9
If the second interpretation is followed, a response adding different
or additional terms would not be either an acceptance of the offer
or a counter-offer. Subsequent performance by the parties would
form a contract by conduct under current subsection (3) (interim
draft (5)). Again, this is a plausible interpretation.90 The current
draft, however, may continue the implausible as well. If a response
expressly conditions acceptance on the terms of the acceptance, it
is a counter-offer. Again, no contract exists through the exchanged
writings. If the parties perform, is there a contract by conduct con-
taining matching terms and the Code's supplementary terms? In
the example of the clear counter-offer inviting acceptance of the
goods to indicate acceptance of the counter-offer's terms, does sub-
section (3) apply and emasculate the counter-offer "accepted" by
performance? Courts have inevitably confronted this problem.
B. The Counter-Offer Case Law
The first significant interpretation of 2-207 occurred in the
now infamous Roto-Lith l case. In Roto-Lith the court was unable
to assimilate the radical change provided by 2-207. It deemed a
variant term in a response to an offer a material alteration. 2 The
court could not conceive of an operative acceptance containing a
materially different term. It concluded that the response was nec-
essarily a counter-offer and that the buyer's subsequent acceptance
of the goods effectively accepted the terms of the counter-offer.
This interpretation of 2-207 was devastating because it recon-
89. J. SUMMERS & R. WHITE, supra note 6, at 33.
We hasten to forewarn the reader that the distinction between these two interpreta-
tions of this language is subtle and not easily determined. The courts have encountered
great difficulty in dealing with such cases. In addition the drafters of the Code appar-
ently had similar problems in anticipating such situations. Under the interpretation of
the restrictive language that makes a responsive document containing additional terms
an acceptance, note that both 2-207(2)(a) and 2-207(2)(c) preclude such additional
terms from becoming part of the contract. It is not clear to us that there could ever be
a situation where 2-207(2)(a) alone precludes such an additional term from becoming
incorporated into the agreement under such an interpretation.
Id.
90. But see supra note 88.
91. Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
92. Id. at 499.
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firmed the pre-Code "last shot" principle.9 The materially differ-
ent term in the seller's response to the offer created a counter-of-
fer. The seller fired the "last shot" in the battle of the forms, and
its form controlled by constituting a counter-offer accepted by the
purchaser's accepting the goods. Roto-Lith was the product of a
court so obsessed with the classical analytical framework that it
arrived at a conclusion and a rationale diametrically opposed to
the statutory language. Roto-Lith, therefore, was destined to be
disapproved if 2-207 was to have any operative effect.94
In Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp. 5 the court attempted to
provide a comprehensive framework for the application of 2-207. It
recognized that the statute's purpose was to alter the "matching
acceptance" rule, which oppressed the offeror under the "last shot"
principle. The unjust result became a just result under 2-207,
which recognizes that printed forms used by buyers and sellers of
goods are seldom identical and often ignored by the parties. 6 Al-
though classical contract theory would prevent the consummation
of a contract because of a disparity in the fine print terms of the
forms, 2-207 recognizes the parties' intent to form a contract, not-
withstanding additional or different terms in what otherwise rea-
sonably appears to be a definite and seasonable expression of ac-
ceptance. The court proceeded to describe the operation of 2-207:
Thus, under Subsection (1), a contract is recognized notwithstanding the fact
93. In pre-Code days the party that sent the last form controlled the terms of the
contract. The different terms in the form were considered a counter-offer, and a contract
was formed on those terms when the goods were accepted. Typically, the seller "fired the
last shot" and won the battle of the forms.
The intent of the draftsmen in enacting Section 2-207 was to reject the common law
"mirror image rule" which in essence stated that if the acceptance in any way differed
from the offer, it was to be viewed as a counter-offer, and no contract would arise....
This application of the "mirror image rule" and the prevailing notions regarding
acceptance had the effect of creating a contract in favor of the party who prepared the
last form, that is, the one who fired the "last shot."
R ALDERMAN, 1 A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 15 n.42 (2d ed.
1983) (formerly Hawkland).
94. Roto-Lith has been criticized frequently. See, e.g., C. Itoh & Co. (America) Inc. v.
Jordan Int'l Co., 552 F.2d 1228, 1235 n.5 (7th Cir. 1977); Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp.,
453 F.2d 1161, 1168 & n.5 (6th Cir. 1972); Ebasco Servs. Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light
Co., 402 F. Supp. 421, 437-38 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 70 Cal. 3d 70, 107,
569 P.2d 751, 763, 141 Cal. Rptr. 157, 169 (1977); Uniroyal, Inc. v. Chambers Gasket & Mfg.
Co., 177 Ind. App. 508, 517-18, 380 N.E.2d 571, 578 (1978).
95. 453 F.2d 1161 (6th Cir. 1972).
96. Id. at 1166. The court stated: "Whereas under common law the disparity between
the fine-print terms in the parties' forms would have prevented the consummation of a con-
tract when these forms are exchanged, Section 2-207 recognizes that in many. , . cases the
parties do not impart such significance to the terms on the printed forms. Id.
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that an acceptance or confirmation contains terms additional to or different
from those of the offer or prior agreement, provided that the offeree's intent
to accept the offer is definitely expressed .... and provided that the offeree's
acceptance is not expressly conditioned on the offeree's assent to the addi-
tional or different terms."
If the "acceptance" were "expressly conditioned on the of-
feror's assent to the additional or different terms," the drafting
history clearly and convincingly indicates that the expressly condi-
tional language converts the response into a counter-offer. Dorton,
however, does not mention this particular effect. Rather, the
Dorton court held that if the "offeree's acceptance is expressly con-
ditioned on the offeror's assent to the additional or different
terms-the entire transaction aborts to this point."'
This interpretation is the genesis of the counter-offer riddle.
Although it studiously avoided using the term "counter-offer," the
court undoubtedly recognized the power of acceptance created by
an "expressly conditional acceptance." If the buyer had signed and
delivered the seller's acknowledgment containing an expressly con-
ditional acceptance, this act "indeed could have been recognized as
the buyer's assent to [the seller's variant] terms." 99 The court,
however, refused to distinguish the effects of a nonacceptance from
the effects of a counter-offer-the entire transaction aborts in ei-
ther case. If a seller-offeree sends a nonacceptance in response to a
buyer's offer, but subsequently ships the goods, the seller's written
response to the offer is not a counter-offer and, therefore, creates
no power of acceptance. The shipment of the goods is a new offer
by conduct, and the buyer's acceptance of the goods is an accept-
ance by conduct. The situation is precisely described in subsection
(3) of 2-207, which provides: "Conduct by both parties which rec-
ognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a con-
tract for sale although the writings of the parties do not otherwise
establish a contract." 00
If the response from the seller-offeree expressly conditions ac-
ceptance on the buyer's assent to variant terms, however, the of-
feree has sent a counter-offer. Although it rejects the buyer's offer,
the counter-offer does not break off negotiations; it seeks to carry
them forward by creating a new power of acceptance. 101 If the
97. Id.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Id. at 1168.
100. Id. at 1165 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-207(3)) (emphasis added).
101. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39 comment a (1981); see supra text ac-
companying note 85.
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seller has made a counter-offer, the transaction does not "abort."
Subsequent shipment of the goods by the offeree who has made
the counter-offer is not a new offer. It is shipment pursuant to the
terms of the previously sent counter-offer. Because the court in
Dorton recognized the possibility of a contract including the vari-
ant terms of the offeree's acknowledgment, it thereby recognized
the possibility of a counter-offer and the buyer's assent to that
counter-offer. The court, however, did not recognize the possibility
that the offeror's conduct in accepting the goods could be an ac-
ceptance of the counter-offer. Its failure to recognize this possibil-
ity is the result of a curious analysis.
The court believed its responsibility included determining
whether the language of the offeree's acknowledgment was the
equivalent of an expressly conditional acceptance. The response to
the offer contained the following language: "The acceptance of
your order is subject to all of the terms and conditions on the face
and reverse side hereof, including arbitration.' 10 2 The court held
this language insufficient to meet the 2-207(1) standard that the
acceptance must be "expressly conditional on [the offeror's] assent
to additional or different terms." The court reasoned that:
[I]t is not enough that an acceptance is expressly conditional on additional or
different terms; rather, an acceptance must be expressly conditional on the
offeror's assent to those terms. . . [T]he Subsection (1) proviso. . . was in-
tended to apply only to an acceptance which clearly reveals that the offeree is
unwilling to proceed with the transaction unless he is assured of the offeror's
assent to the additional or different terms therein.10'
This construction of the 2-207(1) proviso is consistent with the
original intention of the principal draftsman. Unless the accept-
ance "clearly reveals" the offeree's unwillingness to proceed with
the deal except on the terms of the response, the response is not a
counter-offer. Suppose, however, the response does "clearly reveal"
that intention of the offeree. How may the offeror assent to the
counter-offer? Noting that the Code does not define "assent,' 10 4
the court considered the acknowledgment form before it. The ac-
knowledgment form specified "at least seven types of action or in-
action on the part of the buyer [offeror] which. . . would be
deemed to bind the buyer to the terms therein." 0 5 The court dis-
cussed only the following two of the seven types of action or inac-
102. 453 F.2d at 1164 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 1168 (emphasis in original).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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tion: (1) the buyer's signing and delivering the acknowledgment to
the seller "which indeed could have been recognized as the buyer's
assent. ..,"06 and (2) the buyer's retention of the acknowledg-
ment for ten days without objection "which could never have been
recognized as the buyer's assent to the additional or different
terms where acceptance is expressly conditional on that assent.' 10 7
A footnote explains that the latter could not be a manifestation of
assent: "The common law has never recognized silence or inaction
as a mode of acceptance."' 08 There can be no argument with this
explanation. Suppose, however, the buyer-offeror had not signed
and delivered the seller's expressly conditional response, but had
manifested silence and action rather than silence and inaction.
Suppose the buyer had accepted the goods. Would this active con-
duct in response to a clear counter-offer constitute acceptance of
the counter-offer containing the variant terms? The court's re-
sponse can be gleaned only from another footnote. The trial court
had held the "subject to" language in the acknowledgment suffi-
cient to meet the requirements of the 2-207(1) proviso. Having de-
cided that the response was expressly conditional on the buyer's
assent to variant terms, the trial court then found a contract by
conduct under 2-207(3) because the parties had performed-the
seller shipped and the buyer accepted the goods. Thus, the trial
court found that the seller had made a counter-offer, but that the
buyer's accepting the goods did not constitute an acceptance of the
counter-offer. Rather, a contract by conduct was formed and the
variant terms in the counter-offer were excised. On appeal, the
court upheld this view. 09
As the court noted, the Code does not define "assent." There-
fore, the common-law definition of "assent" is mandated."0 That
conduct may manifest "assent" is hornbook law.", If the counter-
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1168 n.4.
109. Id. at 1169 n.6 ("Absent our conclusion that [the] acknowledgments do not fall
within the subsection 2-207(1) proviso, we believe that the District Court correctly applied
Subsection 2-207(3) . . .").
110. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1978). This section requires the application of pre-Code law un-
less the Code expressly displaces the pre-Code concept.
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 (1979):
Conduct as Manifestation of Assent
(1) The manifestation of assent may be made wholly or partly by written or spoken
words or by other acts or by failure to act.
(2) The conduct of a party is not effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he
intends to engage in the conduct and knows or has reason to know that the other party
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offer in this case had been clear to a reasonable offeror, why should
the offeror's acceptance of the goods after receiving the counter-
offer be ignored as a manifestation of acceptance? Apparently, the
trial and appellate courts in Dorton viewed the buyer's acceptance
of the goods as inaction rather than action. At least one judge in a
subsequent case cites Dorton as exclusive authority for the pro-
position that the offeror's acceptance of the goods in response to a
counter-offer was ineffective as an acceptance because acceptance
of the goods manifests silence and inaction.1 12 Yet, if a counter-
offer clearly reveals that the seller-offeree is shipping the goods on
his own terms, and the buyer has reason to know that clear inten-
tion, the buyer's acceptance of the goods should manifest a con-
duct acceptance of the counter-offer. The Dorton conclusion finds
no support in 2-207 or any other section of the Code. Yet Dorton
creates an anomalous and unworkable precedent because it fears
that recognizing a conduct acceptance would be a return to the
"last shot" principle' 13-the basic evil that 2-207 was designed to
overcome.
The basic evil that Dorton sought to avoid was the characteri-
zation of a response to an offer as a counter-offer simply because it
contained variant terms, but otherwise appeared to be an accept-
ance. The conventional wisdom of 2-207 recognizes that purpose.
Offerees respond by seeking to avoid the excision of variant terms
in their responses to offers by including conditional language like
the "subject to" language in Dorton. Should the same response be
called a counter-offer simply because it adds "subject to" or simi-
lar language to its "terms and conditions"? Dorton answers no,
and that result provokes no quarrel. To hold otherwise would un-
fairly surprise the offeror. Again, suppose the language in the re-
sponse indicated clearly that the offeree will proceed with the
transaction only on the terms of the response, and a buyer-offeror
would understand sufficiently the response to mean that the seller
will deal only on the seller's terms.114 If the goods are subsequently
may infer from his conduct that be assents.
(3) The conduct of a party may manifest assent even though he does not in fact assent.
In such cases a resulting contract may be voidable because of fraud, duress, mistake, or
other invalidating cause.
Id.
112. Uniroyal, Inc. v. Chambers Gasket & Mfg. Co., 380 N.E.2d 571, 582 n.2 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1978) (Buchanan, C.J., concurring).
113. See supra note 93.
114. Should the offeror "reasonably understand" the response as an acceptance or a
counter-offer? RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 57 (1979). Should the offeror "fairly
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shipped and the buyer accepts them, Dorton will find a contract by
conduct under 2-207(3), which will excise the seller's variant terms.
The contract would include those terms from the counter-offer
only if the buyer manifested assent verbally rather than by con-
duct. Under Dorton, accepting even the clearest counter-offer by
conduct seems impossible. Why does Dorton insist upon this radi-
cal view of 2-207? Only three explanations appear plausible.
First, Dorton's analysis of the statutory proviso in 2-207(1) is
confused. The case suggests that the acceptance must be expressly
conditional on the offeror's assent to the variant terms in the re-
sponse. It cites a dictionary as authority for the following view:
"That the acceptance is predicated on the offeror's assent must be
'directly and distinctly stated or expressed rather than implied or
left to inference.' "115 The requirement that an expressly condi-
tional acceptance must be clearly stated to be viewed as a counter-
offer is not arguable. This requirement, however, deals with the
response to the offer and not the acceptance of that counter-offer.
The court unwittingly may have required the acceptance of the
counter-offer to be "distinctly stated or expressed rather than im-
plied or left to inference." Second, the court in Dorton may have
felt compelled to make subsection (3) of 2-207 operative in any
situation in which the exchanged writings of the parties did not
form a contract. Thus, it concluded that whether the response to
the offer was a nonacceptance or a counter-offer, "the entire trans-
action aborts." The language of 2-207(3), which considers conduct
by both parties as evidence of the contract,116 is necessarily appli-
cable in the offer/nonacceptance situation, but is not necessarily
applicable in the offer/counter-offer situation. Third, although
Dorton insists upon a "clear" statement in the response to create a
counter-offer, the court may have doubted the ability of courts to
determine whether a particular response to a counter-offer was suf-
ficiently clear to constitute a second counter-offer. Insistence on
express language manifesting assent to the counter-offer avoids
that problem. It also constitutes an unwarranted modification of
the law of counter-offers.
Dorton leaves a number of questions unanswered. What is a
interpret" the response as an acceptance or a counter-offer? RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 61 (1979). For an integration of these two tests, see Murray, Standardized Agree-
ments, supra note 9.
115. 453 F.2d at 1168.
116. See supra text accompanying note 100. For text of U.C.C. 2-207(3), see supra
note 2.
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sufficiently clear manifestation of the offeree's unwillingness to
deal only on the terms of the offer? What test should be used to
determine sufficient clarity? To whom must the manifestation be
sufficiently clear? Is it ever possible to recognize a conduct accept-
ance of a sufficiently clear counter-offer? If the "subject to" lan-
guage was insufficient to create a counter-offer in Dorton, would
language more precisely tracking the statutory proviso of 2-207(1)
necessarily create a counter-offer?
In C. Itoh & Co. (America) Inc. v. Jordan International Co. 117
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed some of these
questions in extrapolating Dorton. In Itoh the seller's response to a
purchase order contained the following language: "Seller's accept-
ance ... expressly conditional on Buyer's assent to the additional
or different terms and conditions set forth below and printed on
the reverse side. If these terms and conditions are not acceptable,
Buyer should notify Seller at once."' 18 The response to the offer
contained an arbitration term. After the exchange of forms, the
parties performed. The court was asked to decide whether the ar-
bitration term was part of the contract. The language was con-
strued to be a counter-offer because the printed form response
was sufficiently similar to the statutory proviso language, unlike
the language in Dorton."" One reading of Dorton may require lan-
guage sufficiently similar to the statutory proviso. Another reading
of Dorton, however, may require language that "clearly revealed"
the offeree's unwillingness to contract on any terms other than its
own. The relevant question, therefore, is whether the offeree's re-
sponse in Itoh clearly revealed that intention.
On its face, the response in Itoh replicating the statutory pro-
viso is anything but clear. The statutory proviso is angular. Law
students require some time to reflect upon the proviso's language
before they can comprehend its significance; Members of the New
York Law Revision Commission wondered about the language
when it first appeared in Comment form.'20 Karl Llewellyn ac-
cepted a paraphrase of the language in Comment form as permit-
ting a conditional acceptance that would be understood as condi-
tional by the reasonable merchant.' 21 Llewellyn sought to avoid
117. 552 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1977).
118. Id. at 1230.
119. See supra text accompanying note 102.
120. 1954 Law Revision Commission Report, supra note 16, at 116 (180); see supra
text accompanying notes 69-73.
121. Id. at 117 (181).
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the technical discovery of a conditional acceptance when no rea-
sonable businessman would find one. Should a reasonable offeror
understand that language similar to that found in Itoh results in a
counter-offer? In other words, does that language clearly reveal the
offeree's willingness to proceed only on the terms of the response?
Certainly Llewellyn would not be satisfied with language that oper-
ates technically regardless of the offeror's understanding. The
more interesting question is whether the Itoh court assumed that
language tracking the proviso language would be clearly under-
stood as a counter-offer. The emphatic answer is no.
The court explained the ramifications of its holding for the
seller-offeree. By ignoring the seller's counter-offer and insisting
that the buyer's acceptance of the goods did not constitute an ac-
ceptance of the counter-offer, the court followed Dorton in finding
a contract by conduct under 2-207(3). The court was convinced
that this conclusion "does not result in any unfair prejudice to a
seller who elects to insert in his standard sales acknowledgment
form the statement that acceptance is expressly conditional on
buyer's assent to additional terms contained therein." '122 The bene-
fit to the seller is that using the "expressly conditional" clause per-
mits him "to walk away from the transaction without incurring any
liability so long as the buyer has not in the interim expressly as-
sented to the additional terms."'23 If the seller does not intend to
enter into a contract unless the buyer assents to his terms, he may
simply forbear delivery of the goods until the buyer expressly as-
sents. If the seller chooses to ship the goods without the buyer's
assent, "he can hardly complain when the contract formed under
Subsection (3) as a result of the parties' conduct is held not to
include those [additional] terms.' 1 24 Thus, the seller has the bene-
fit of being able to "walk away" from the deal, but he suffers the
detriment of losing the effect of his counter-offer if he proceeds
with performance before obtaining the buyer's express assent to
his terms. Precisely why does the seller lose the effect of his
counter-offer? The court's answer to this question is particularly
revealing. The court stated: "Since the seller injected ambiguity
into the transaction by inserting the 'expressly conditional' clause
122. 552 F.2d at 1237. The court refers to the seller's form as a counter-offer and
states that, although under common law the buyer's performance would have constituted an
acceptance of the seller's counter-offer, "the Code has effectuated a radical departure from
the common law rule." Id. at 1236.
123. Id. at 1237-38.
124. Id. at 1238.
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in his form, he, and not the buyer, should bear the consequence of
that ambiguity under Subsection (3).''125
The ramifications of this analysis are astonishing. A buyer
sends a purchase order, which is an offer to purchase goods. The
seller sends its acknowledgment containing the "expressly condi-
tional" clause. The fundamental question under 2-207(1) is
whether the response to the offer was "a definite and seasonable
expression of acceptance." Neither Dorton nor Itoh deals effec-
tively with that fundamental question. No case law concentrates
on that question. The only relevant statement in Dorton suggests
that a response containing additional or different terms is an ac-
ceptance, "provided that the offeree's intent to accept the offer is
definitely expressed. '126
Itoh is even less helpful in deciding the basic question of how
one decides whether a response is an acceptance. The opinion,
however, does contain one clear instruction: if the response con-
tains an expressly conditional clause sufficiently similar to the stat-
utory proviso, the response must be a counter-offer; it cannot pos-
sibly be an expression of acceptance. Moreover, this directive is
stated in the teeth of the court's insistence that a response con-
taining such a clause is necessarily ambiguous. The only possible
conclusion to draw from Itoh is that an offeree who inserts an "ex-
pressly conditional" clause in its response has (a) injected ambigu-
ity in that response, and (b) made a counter-offer. Is the response
a counter-offer because the original offeror reasonably would un-
derstand it as one? The question scarcely survives its statement.
Because the response is ambiguous, the original offeror would not
understand its import. The response is a counter-offer only be-
cause it contains formula language from the last proviso of 2-
207(1). If a response to an offer is ambiguous or equivocal, the of-
feror reasonably may understand or fairly interpret the response as
an acceptance. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts clearly sets
forth tests of the offeror's reasonable understanding or fair inter-
pretation to be applied to ambiguous responses on the basis that
the offeror is an innocent party who neither knew, nor had reason
to know, that the seller intended the reply as a counter-offer rather
than an acceptance. 11 7 Yet Itoh insists that an ambiguous response
containing formula language is a counter-offer regardless of the of-
125. Id. (emphasis added).
126. 453 F.2d at 1166.
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 57 (1979); see Murray, Standardized
Agreement, supra note 9, at 747-48.
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feror's reasonable understanding or fair interpretation. A subse-
quent case in the Dorton and Itoh line confirms this analysis.
In Uniroyal, Inc. v. Chambers Gasket & Manufacturing Co. 128
the offeree's "order acknowledgment" contained the following sen-
tence: "Our acceptance of the order is conditional on the buyer's
acceptance of the conditions of sale printed on the reverse side
hereof. 1 29 The majority opinion held this language sufficiently
similar to the statutory proviso to characterize it as an "expressly
conditional acceptance." Like Dorton, the court studiously avoided
the counter-offer characterization, although it recognized the
power of acceptance created by the "expressly conditional accept-
ance." If a buyer-offeror expressly assented to the expressly condi-
tional acceptance, a contract would be formed on the seller's terms.
Therefore, the expressly conditional acceptance is a counter-offer,
notwithstanding the majority's refusal to characterize it as one. A
concurring opinion insists on the counter-offer characterization.30
Both opinions reject a conduct acceptance of the counter-offer be-
cause the "hypothesis" of 2-207 is that "businessmen do not read
exchanged printed forms. . ."' and that the buyer-offeror would
not learn of any variant terms in the response to the offer. Yet the
court insisted that the buyer-offeror may assent expressly to the
counter-offer. Therefore, the buyer-offeror may learn of the variant
terms. If he learns of them and expressly assents to them, he will
be bound by them. The court refused to consider the possibility of
a counter-offer that could be accepted by conduct regardless of the
counter-offer's clarity. It ignored the possibility that a counter-of-
fer could be sufficiently clear to allow conduct acceptance, al-
though it was willing to admit the theoretical possibility of the
buyer-offeror learning of the variant terms and expressly assenting
to them. Like Dorton and Itoh, Uniroyal does not suggest a test to
determine whether a response to an offer should be deemed "ex-
pressly conditional." The court assumed the test is mechani-
cal-sufficient compatibility between the statutory proviso's lan-
guage and the language of the response to the offer, regardless of
the offeror's reasonable understanding. It felt compelled to inter-
128. 380 N.E.2d 571.
129, Id. at 577.
130. Id. at 582 (Buchanan, C.J., concurring).
131. Id. at 578. The court stated: "[T]he hypothesis of Section 2-207 that businessmen
do not read exchanged printed forms assumes that the offeror-buyer would not learn of the
term." Id. (quoting R. DEUSENBERG & L. KING, SALES & BULK TRANSFERS UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3.06[4] (1977).
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pret the language in the form before it as counter-offer language,
even though it suggested that the buyer-offeror would not under-
stand the language as a counter-offer. Because the offeror would
not understand the language, protecting the offeror was essential.
The only sufficient protection was to insist that the offeror must
assent expressly to the counter-offer before he would be bound to
the counter-offer's terms.
This line of cases suggests that an offeror reasonably may as-
sume that the original exchange of writings formed a contract, not-
withstanding the proviso language in the response to the offer. Be-
cause of the necessary, technical interpretation of the response's
proviso clause, however, no contract will be recognized and the of-
feree may "walk away" from the deal. An offeror may be surprised
to learn that no contract was formed-unfairly surprised and op-
pressed. The implication is that fairness to the offeror must be sac-
rificed to some notion of fidelity to technical language, even though
that notion is diametrically opposed to the underlying philosophy
of 2-207 and all of Article 2-fidelity to the factual bargain of the
parties. The offeror and offeree may believe, pursuant to their rea-
sonable commercial understanding, that they have a "closed
deal." 132 Under the Dorton-Itoh-Uniroyal line of cases, that rea-
sonable belief is overcome by inserting in the response to the offer
formalistic language that no reasonable businessman would treat
as language creating a counter-offer. If the parties proceed to per-
form, the offeror now needs protection. Because he may not have
been aware of the technical constraints, he should not be op-
pressed by the terms of the formalistic counter-offer. To avoid this
oppression, we simply will ignore normal counter-offer rules and
insist that this counter-offer, unlike others, requires the offeror's
assent before the offeror will be bound by the terms of the counter-
offer. Because the offeror did not understand the response to be a
counter-offer, he never is going to assent. Therefore, the scenario
lacks verisimilitude. We will achieve a fair result in the most tortu-
ous fashion, ignoring the value of law settlement. But we also will
tolerate a manifestly unfair result. If the offeree chooses not to
perform after sending its technical counter-offer-not because its
counter-offer is not accepted, but, for example, because the offeree
chooses to exact a higher price-no contract exists, notwithstand-
ing the defeat of the offeror's reasonable expectations. The prece-
132. According to comment 2 to U.C.C. § 2-207, if in commercial understanding a pro-
posed deal has in fact been closed, it is recognized as a contract.
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dent set by this analysis contributes heavily to the chaos of 2-207.
What would a court following this line of cases do with a genu-
ine counter-offer-a response to an offer containing a clear state-
ment that the goods will be shipped as an accommodation to the
buyer, who should reject them if the terms in this genuine counter-
offer are not acceptable? If a reasonable offeror should understand
this statement to be exactly what it purports to be, may the offeror
ignore this response, accept the goods, and rely upon the Dorton-
Itoh-Uniroyal precedent and expect judicial recognition of a 2-
207(3) contract? If a court fulfilled that expectation, the oppres-
sion and unfair surprise to the offeree would be extreme. Nothing
in the case law precludes this result, although the rationale based
on fairness to the offeree/counter-offeror because of the ambiguity
in his response to the offer would not apply.1 33 Unless courts begin
133. An opinion rendered on July 22, 1986, provides an illustration of this oppressive
situation in conformity with Itoh and its ancestry. In Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack
Corp., 794 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986), Metal-Matic ("Metal") supplied tubing to Krack for
the manufacture of cooling units. Krack and Metal contemplated a ten year contract for the
supply of tubing. At the beginning of each year, Krack sent its purchase order stating its
estimated requirements for the year to Metal. Metal's acknowledgment responses contained
clauses disclaiming warranties and excluding consequential damages. It also contained a
clause tracking the statutory proviso of § 2-207(1). Sometime during the ten year relation-
ship, Krack's purchasing manager discussed the warranty and remedy clauses on the Metal
acknowledgment with an officer of Metal. The manager tried to convince Metal to change
the clauses. Metal refused. After the discussion, Krack continued to accept and pay for the
tubing shipped by Metal. Later, Krack sold a cooling unit to Diamond Fruit Growers. A
defect in the unit which caused a loss of fruit was traced to a defect in the tubing supplied
by Metal. Diamond sued Krack to recover the loss and Krack brought a third-party com-
plaint against Metal. Metal claimed that its exclusion of consequential damages clause and
its clause limiting liability to refund of the purchase price or replacement or repair of the
tubing protected it against the liability that Krack sought to impose on Metal. If there had
been no discussion of the clauses in the Metal form, a strict application of Itoh would have
resulted in an application of § 2-207(3)-a contract by conduct resulting in the excision of
the Metal clauses from the contract because Krack would not have "assented" to the Metal
clauses. Metal argued that the discussion of these clauses, Metal's refusal to delete or
change them, and the subsequent acceptance of further shipments by Krack constituted
assent to Metal's terms. The court found Metal's argument "appealing" because the seller
(Metal) had not only included the clauses in its form, but orally stated that these were the
only terms on which it was willing to sell the tubing. Nonetheless, the court rejected Metal's
argument. The court interpreted the § 2-207(1) proviso language as requiring "a specific and
unequivocal expression of assent on the part of the offeror when the offeree conditions its
acceptance on assent to additional or different terms." 794 F.2d at 1445. A conduct accept-
ance, even with full knowledge of the offeree's terms and with the further actual knowledge
that the offeree would ship only on those terms, was deemed inadequate. The court cited
Itoh for this extrapolation. This analysis suggests that a buyer-offer or will ultimately pre-
vail under 2-207(3) if he does not seek to have such clauses removed from the seller's ac-
knowledgment. Moreover, a buyer-offeror will still prevail under 2-207(3) even if he at-
tempts to have such clauses removed and knows that the seller's further shipments are
based upon such terms in the acknowledgment form. Thus, the holding supports the pro-
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to focus upon the essential question-the reasonable understand-
ing or fair interpretation of the response to the offer-this ques-
tion will remain unanswered.
C. The Commentators
In prior efforts to dispel the confusion of the current case law
and to suggest fidelity to the underlying philosophy of Article 2
and 2-207, I have suggested a test that has been characterized sub-
sequently as "symmetrical and uncomplicated"1' 4 and as present-
ing "a principled means"' 5 of resolving 2-207 problems. My test is
described as inquiring "in every case whether a reasonable offeror
would believe that the offeree intends to close the deal by its re-
sponse. If so, the response concludes the deal on the offeror's
terms, subject to the possible addition of nonmaterial terms ap-
pearing on the offeree's form." 136 Notwithstanding the other attrib-
utes of this approach, the test has been criticized. One commenta-
tor argued that:
[A]n acknowledgment which a reasonable offeror believes closes the deal does
not necessarily indicate the offeree's intent to accept all of the offeror's
terms. The offeree simply may have chosen a form method, such as a condi-
tional assent clause, to object to the offeror's nondickered terms, rather than
objection on a costly, term-by-term basis.137
This criticism suggests that the offeree requires an efficient
method of objecting to the terms of the offer."3 8 The efficient
method involves two types of counter-offers.
The first counter-offer would be the true, real, or genuine
counter-offer stated so clearly that an offeror reasonably would un-
derstand it as a counter-offer. 3 9 If a response were a real counter-
offer, subsequent performance would bind the offeror to the terms
of the counter-offer. The offeror should have understood that the
offeree shipped the goods exclusively on his own terms and that
position that even a genuine counter-offer, understood as such by the offeror, may not be
accepted by the buyer's action in accepting the goods.
134. See Travalio, supra note 5, at 352 ("Dean Murray's approach is symmetrical and
uncomplicated to apply. Its touchstone is a single, uncomplicated factual inquiry, from
which all else flows with compelling logic."); see also Murray, Incipient Unconscionability,
supra note 5.
135. Travalio, supra note 5, at 352. The author's term "principled analysis" for refer-
ring to Dean Murray's analysis in Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 5, is adopted for
the comparison of analyses that follow.
136. Travalio, supra note 5, at 354.
137. Id. (emphasis in original).
138. Id. at 356.
139. Id. at 361.
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the offeror's acceptance of the goods would constitute acceptance
of the real counter-offer. If the response to the offer were not suffi-
ciently clear to be a real counter-offer, the response would be a
definite expression of acceptance. This view is in accord with this
Article's earlier suggestion concerning a fundamental change in
classical contract doctrine effected by 2-207.14° Prior to the Code,
different or additional terms in a response would be construed as
converting the response into a counter-offer, notwithstanding other
language in the response that a reasonable businessman would re-
gard as an acceptance. Under 2-207, if an offeree desires to make a
counter-offer, he must say so in no uncertain terms. The presump-
tion is that the response is an acceptance unless the offeree clearly
manifests an intention to make a counter-offer.
The suggested method adds the second type of counter-offer,
which may be called the statutory language, constructed, or "fake"
counter-offer, to the sound analysis regarding the real counter-of-
fer. Consider the following scenario: An offeror receives a response
that appears to be a definite expression of acceptance even though
it contains different or additional terms. Because it does not
clearly reveal an intention to create a counter-offer, it is an accept-
ance. The expression of acceptance, however, contains an "ex-
pressly conditional" clause that sufficiently tracks the statutory
proviso of 2-207(1). The author recognizes that the offeror would
be "unaware of the existence or the legal effect of the clause" and
would assume "that a contract existed."' A contract, however,
would not exist.142 The "fake" counter-offer would be effective to
protect the offeree against the terms in the offeror's form, but, un-
like the real counter-offer situation, subsequent performance would
not bind the offeror to the terms of the fake counter-offer. The
effect of this method would be to permit the offeree to object effi-
ciently to the terms of the offer. The "fake" counter-offer provides
effective protection to the offeree who sends what appears to be a
definite expression of acceptance by providing a technical device to
avoid the assumption that the offeree intends to accept all of the
offeror's terms.
Understanding why the author chose this particular analysis
to deal with the counter-offer riddle created by the case law is dif-
ficult. He suggests that the solution is reconcilable with the extant
140. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
141. Travalio, supra note 5, at 364.
142. The curiosity is a simultaneous definite and seasonable expression of acceptance
and a counter-offer, through the use of the statutory proviso analysis.
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case law.143 The author's analysis, however, differs markedly from
the case law. The case law does not seem to recognize, as the au-
thor clearly does, that the threshold test of whether the response is
a definite expression of acceptance should be determined by the
reasonable understanding of the offeror. The cases do not address
this question.14 4 Nor do the cases suggest the possibility of two
types of counter-offers with different effects. Although the author
suggests that some of the drafting history of 2-207 supports his
analysis, in the end he recognizes that his interpretation of an ear-
lier draft of 2-207 "is of little relevance to an interpretation of sec-
tion 2-207 today.' 45 We have seen, however, an analysis of 2-207's
drafting history that is clear and convincing evidence of the single
counter-offer understanding.14 Neither the drafters, their advisors,
nor the courts have ever hinted at the possibility of two types of
counter-offers. The author relies most heavily upon the "fairness,
predictability and efficiency" of his formalistic approach, 147 al-
though he recognizes the "bias" 48 of the Code against formalism.
Examining the "fairness, predictability and efficiency" of the sug-
gested double counter-offer approach as contrasted with the princi-
pled approach, 4 9 provides important insights into the counter-of-
fer riddle.
If an offeror receives a response he should reasonably under-
stand as an acceptance, is it fair to surprise the offeror by the in-
sertion of an "expressly conditional" clause that precludes the for-
mation of a contract and defeats the offeror's expectations? If no
contract is formed, and the offeree's intention not to be bound by
the terms of the offer is allegedly protected, the result is unfair to
the offeror who reasonably believes a contract exists. Under this
approach, if the purchase order is silent as to warranties, remedies,
and arbitration, the inclusion of warranty disclaimers, remedy lim-
itations or exclusions, and an arbitration clause in a response con-
taining the 2-207 proviso will not cause these terms to be part of
the contract unless the offeror expressly assents to the different or
additional terms. He will not assent, because he thought the re-
143. Travalio, supra note 5, at 366.
144. For a case that expressly disregards the reasonable understanding of the offeror,
see Diamond Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Krack Corp., 794 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986), discussed in
note 133, supra.
145. Id. at 369.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 68-80.
147. Travalio, supra note 5, at 370.
148. Id. at 364; see supra notes 16-42 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 135.
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sponse was an acceptance. He would have no reason to assent ex-
pressly to the different or additional terms. The author recognizes
this problem, but clings to the view that, even though the offeree
will have to surrender his terms absent express assent by the of-
feror, the offeree is protected against the offeror's terms.150 Yet, if
the seller chooses to perform after the exchange of an offer and
"fake" counter-offer, the buyer's acceptance of the goods will result
in a 2-207(3) contract that includes only matching terms and per-
mits U.C.C. supplementary terms. The result is a contract contain-
ing the usual warranties and remedies, and excluding arbitration.
The question arises whether the offeree, by inserting the "ex-
pressly conditional" clause to avoid manifesting acceptance of the
offeror's terms, intended to jettison'all of his terms in the acknowl-
edgment and to be bound to a contract containing all of the terms
he was attempting to avoid by inserting the "expressly condi-
tional"o clause? How does the suggested analysis promote "fair-
ness" to either the offeror or the offeree?
One of the criticisms of the principled analysis is that it re-
quires a factual inquiry to determine whether the offeror reasona-
bly would understand the response as an acceptance or as a
counter-offer, and that this inquiry is unpredictable and promotes
uncertainty.151 Under the suggested modification allowing "fake"
counter-offers, this question would remain and allegedly would be
resolved by insisting that only those responses that clearly mani-
fest counter-offers to reasonable offers would be counter-offers. 152
The author recognizes that some uncertainty will remain under
this test, but assumes that the level of uncertainty will be tolera-
ble. The suggested and principled analyses differ little, if at all, on
this point. With respect to the "fake" counter-offer, the author ap-
parently believes that it will be relatively simple for courts to de-
termine whether particular "expressly conditional" clauses are suf-
ficiently similar to the statutory proviso. This view ignores the
problems in the extant case law regarding the proper interpreta-
tion of particular responses and their similarity to the statutory
language.15 3 In Dorton the court held that the language, "subject to
150. Travalio, supra note 5, at 370.
151. Id. at 356-57.
152. Id. at 361.
153. In Boese-Hilburn Co. v. Dean Mach. Co., 616 S.W.2d 520, (Mo. Ct. App. 1981),
the court recognized that "U]udicial interpretation of the language 'expressly made condi-
tional' contained in U.C.C. § 2-207(1) ranges across a broad spectrum." Id. at 525. See also
Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569 (10th Cir. 1984).
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all of the terms and conditions on the face and reverse side
In addition to the examples in notes 154-56 infra, consider the following: Acceptance
"predicated on the following clarifications, additions or modifications to the order" held
expressly conditional in Construction Aggregates Corp. v. Hewitt-Robins, Inc., 404 F.2d 505,
509 (7th Cir. 1968); "acceptance of this order shall be deemed to constitute an agreement
. . . to the conditions named hereon and supersedes all previous agreements" held not ex-
pressly conditional in Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596 F.2d 924, 925, 927
(9th Cir. 1979). "Acceptance of this order is expressly limited to the conditions of purchase
printed on the reverse side" was first held to be sufficiently similar to the "expressly condi-
tional" language of 2-207(1) in Reaction Molding Technologies, Inc., v. General Elec. Co.,
585 F. Supp. 1097, 1108 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (denial of partial summary judgment, decision on
merits reported at 588 F. Supp. 1280). Upon reconsideration, however, the trial judge de-
cided the quoted language was not sufficiently similar to the statutory proviso's language:
The clause in the present case states that acceptance is expressly limited to the
conditions printed on the reverse side. Although at first blush the clause appears to fit
within the proviso, upon closer examination of the wording of the clause and the com-
mercial context in this case, I conclude that the proviso does not apply. First, the
clause states that acceptance is "expressly limited" rather than "expressly conditional."
More importantly, the clause states that acceptance is limited to the different terms
and conditions on the reverse side, rather than stating that acceptance is conditional
on the offeror's "assent" to the different or additional terms. Furthermore, the clause
was preprinted on a form contract, rather than typed or written into the contract. This
same clause appeared in the purchase orders for the 1980 contracts between plaintiff
and defendant. . . . Thus, plaintiff must have reasonably believed in 1982, that de-
fendant intended to proceed with the transaction in spite of the language in the clause.
Reaction Molding Technologies, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 588 F. Supp. 1280, 1288 (E.D. Pa.
1984) (decision on merits; denial of summary judgment reported at 585 F. Supp. 1097). This
recent illustration of a dedicated trial judge struggling with the question of the proper inter-
pretation of a printed clause in comparison with the statutory proviso of 2-207(1) takes on
an almost Jarndysian character. Between the two opinions, the judge read Dorton, 453 F.2d
1161 (6th Cir. 1972), and became terribly confused. His struggle to justify his reversal begins
with the rather pathetic suggestion that there is a considerable distinction between "ex-
pressly limited" and "expressly conditional." 588 F. Supp. at 1288. The influence of Dorton
then becomes overbearing because the clause at issue in Reaction Molding did not state that
acceptance was conditioned upon the offeror's assent to the different or additional terms. If
an offeror understands that the offeree is conditioning or limiting acceptance to the terms of
his form, should that offeror not also understand that the offeree does not want to deal on
any other terms and, unless the offeror assents to the terms on the offeree's form, the offeree
does not intend to close the deal? The Dorton notion that acceptance must be conditioned
expressly on the offeror's assent to the different or additional terms in the offeree's response
has never made any sense. Llewellyn would put the question very simply: Did the response
tell the offeror that the offeree intended to say, "This is an acceptance only if the additional
terms that I state are taken by you"? See supra text accompanying note 70.
Beyond these formalistic notions, the judge then attempts to inject some rationality
into the interpretation process. Was the clause on a printed form rather than handwritten
or typewritten? If the clause at issue had been handwritten or typewritten rather than
printed, would that change require a different result? Certainly the court does not suggest
that only handwritten or typewritten clauses can be effective to create counter-offers. Be-
cause the same printed clause appeared in prior deals and the parties performed notwith-
standing the clause, did they intend to have a closed deal this time, regardless of the clause?
Suppose the clause had been printed, but replicated the language of the 2-207(1) proviso.
Would the appearance of the same tracking clause in earlier documents evidencing deals
that the parties had performed make the clause in the current form inoperative? These
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hereof,'1 54 was not sufficiently similar to the statutory proviso. By
contrast, Uniroyal found that the phrase, "Our acceptance of the
order is conditional on the buyer's acceptance of the conditions of
sale printed on the reverse side hereof,"'155 was sufficiently similar.
A typical merchant-offeror cannot make this distinction. Moreover,
other cases have implied the "expressly conditional" clause simply
because the response contained different or additional terms.156
Thus, the suggestion that the author's analysis provides greater
predictability is more than questionable.
Regarding the value of providing the offeree with an efficient
means of avoiding the terms of the offer, the author views as a
problem any judicial insistence that a printed form contain suffi-
ciently clear language to indicate that the response is a counter-
offer. 157 He admits that offerees could send a counter-offer clearly
stating that goods will be shipped as an accommodation on the of-
feree's terms. He concludes, however, that "[t]his is unlikely to oc-
cur... for efficiency reasons."' 58 This view lacks support. An of-
feree easily could replace an ambiguous statutory proviso clause
with a conspicuous clause on a printed form that clearly indicates
that offeree's intention to make a counter-offer and an accommo-
dation shipment of goods that may be accepted only on the terms
of the counter-offer. Whether the latter clause would be suffi-
ciently clear represents no higher level of uncertainty than the au-
thor is willing to tolerate. Moreover, the author's analysis fails to
consider why offerees prefer an ambiguous response over a clear
counter-offer that would be reasonably understood and fairly inter-
preted by the offeror as a counter-offer. The drafters of ambiguous
responses often may be attempting to deceive the offeror. By
presenting a response that reasonably appears to be an acceptance,
suggestions are not submitted to criticize the struggling trial judge. Rather, they illustrate
the considerable problems that any reasonable judge may discover in attempting to un-
scramble the chaotic precedent in this area.
154. 453 F.2d at 1164.
155. 380 N.E.2d at 577.
156. The much-criticized Roto-Lith case adopted this position. See supra notes 91-94
and accompanying text. In a later case, a federal district court in Massachusetts felt com-
pelled to follow the holding of Roto-Lith even though it recognized the case law criticisms of
Roto-Lith. The court suggested that "[iun the event that the First Circuit overrules Roto-
Lith, this Court will determine whether the [equipment] sold by Westinghouse .. .was in
breach of either an implied warranty of merchantability or of fitness for a particular use."
Gilbert & Bennett Mfg. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 445 F. Supp. 537, 547 (D. Mass.
1977) (footnotes omitted).
157. Travalio, supra note 5, at 357.
158. Id. at 358.
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the offeree may believe that the offeror will conclude that the deal
is "closed" and will expect shipment of the goods. The seller-of-
feree will ship the goods, and, in the overwhelming majority of in-
stances, the buyer will accept the goods, pay for them, and use
them without difficulty. Only in the rare situation when something
goes awry will the seller resort to the ambiguous clause in the ac-
knowledgment form in hopes of avoiding warranty liability, liabil-
ity for consequential damages, or other unfavorable outcomes. By
contrast, if a clear response indicated that no deal was closed, a
seller would have no assurance that the buyer would not regard the
deal as open and maybe go elsewhere to purchase the goods. Is it
better to appear to be accepting the offer while actually inserting
an ambiguous clause that will permit a subsequent technical argu-
ment to avoid unfortunate ramifications? This technical defense is
an abomination of the good faith and conscionability standards of
Article 2,159 undermines the underlying philosophy of Article 2 by
emasculating the factual bargain of the parties in favor of a techni-
cal construct resulting from surreptitious efforts by the offeree,
and perverts the essential purpose of 2-207.
According to some commentators, the principled analysis erro-
neously promotes a contract based on the terms of a clear counter-
offer. Likewise, if the offeror reasonably should have understood
the response to the offer as an acceptance, the contract will reflect
the offeror's terms. Commentators have said this "winner-takes-
all" approach ignores the realities of business because "each party
knows that its form's nondickered terms differ from those on most
of the forms it receives. Moreover, each party is aware that its
form contains a formal objection to the terms on the other party's
form." 160 The approach is criticized as "inappropriate when the
159. Under the merchant's standard of good faith in 2-103(I)(b), inserting a clause
designed to take advantage of technical arguments rather than to communicate clearly the
true intention of the party inserting the clause is neither "honest in fact" nor commercially
reasonable. Therefore, it violates both of the standards of merchant good faith under Arti-
cle 2. Because a surreptitious clause may well result in oppression and unfair surprise, it
also violates the basic principle of the unconscionability section, 2-302. Official comment 1
to 2-302 reads in part:
This section is intended to make it possible for the courts to police explicitly
against the contracts or clauses which they find to be unconscionable. . . . The basic
test is whether, in the light of the general commercial background and the commercial
needs of the particular trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be
unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time of the making of the con-
tract. . . . The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise.
U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1.
160. Travalio, supra note 5, at 355. Professor Travalio relies, to some extent, on the
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parties typically pay little attention to the boilerplate on either
form and consequently do not expect their boilerplate to become
part of the contract."''1 1
This criticism of the principled analysis is inconsistent. How
does each party "know" that its form differs from the other's and
contains a formal objection to the terms on the other form when
the parties "pay little attention to the boilerplate on either form?"
The latter assumption reflects reality. The typical merchant is un-
aware of the legal effect of the form he uses to make offers or to
respond to offers. In fact, the typical purchasing agent or sales rep-
resentative does not know whether he is sending an offer, an ac-
ceptance, or a confirmation." 2 Drafters of printed forms go well
beyond the desires of their merchant-clients in drafting "to the
edge of the possible." 3 It is more than doubtful that an offeree
suggestions of Professor Taylor. Taylor, supra note 5, at 443-44. Taylor's suggestions are
difficult to follow. In dealing with the principled analysis, he suggests that it promotes a
theory allowing a "mechanistic" view of "intent." Yet he recognizes the fundamental test of
the principled analysis: "[T]he important question is what the reasonable buyer should un-
derstand from the seller's response under all surrounding circumstances." Id. at 444.
161. Travalio, supra note 5, at 355.
162. Thousands of purchasing agents with whom I have dealt have no idea that they
use purchase order forms in a chameleonic fashion. The form is used as an offer when it is
the document initiating the potential transaction, it is used as an unwitting acceptance if
the initial "quote" or "bid" from the vendor later is construed to be the offer, and it is used
as a confirmation of a prior oral contract with the vendor. Purchase order forms often are
put to one further use. If prior documentation evidences a contract, a purchase order will
sometimes be used as a delivery order. The terms of the purchase order properly are deemed
inoperative under these circumstances. See, e.g., Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co.,
451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971). Although I have dealt with a much smaller number of vendors'
representatives, their appreciation of the legal effect of their forms appears to rise no higher
than the understanding of purchasing agents. See supra note 47.
163. In his testimony before the Law Revision Commission, Llewellyn stated:
Business lawyers tend to draft to the edge of the possible. Any engineer makes his
construction within a margin of safety, and a wide margin of safety, so that he knows
for sure that he is getting what he is gunning for. The practice of business lawyers has
been. . . to draft. . . to the edge of the possible. . . .I do not find that this is desired
by the business lawyers' clients. . . [L]awyers insist on having all kinds of things that
their clients don't want at all.
1954 Law Revision Commission Hearings, supra note 16, at 113 (177). This view is shared
by others:
[T]he form document is not the direct product of the businessman's knowledge.
Rather, it is the product of the draftsman's art. Between the drafting party and the
actual draftsman, much knowledge, and much of the sense of fairness, may be lost.
More importantly, the professional draftsman's goal is to protect his client as fully as
possible from legally enforceable obligations, including some relating to risks that the
businessman might be willing to accept. In this process, the temptation, and indeed the
art, is to draft up to the limit allowed by law, rather than to change only those features
of the background law that must be altered for the trade reasonably to proceed.
Rakoff, supra note 42, at 1205 (footnotes omitted). As early as 1937 Llewellyn said:
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who sends a form containing the "expressly conditional" language
of 2-207(1) intends to make a "fake" counter-offer. In the case of
the unusual offeree who is completely aware of the current case law
interpretations and intends to "inject ambiguity"'6 4 in the accept-
ance for his own protection, how should a court interpret his re-
sponse to an offer. Whose meaning should prevail? The Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts provides a clear and convincing
answer: the interpretation of the innocent party prevails.6 5
A reasonable offeror who fairly interprets a response as an ac-
ceptance should be able to rely upon that understanding with the
additional or different terms in the response dealt with under 2-
207(2). If the response is interpreted fairly as a counter-offer be-
cause it is sufficiently clear, the offeror must then understand that
any subsequent shipment of the goods is based on those terms. It
is not unfair to insist that offerees will be deemed to have accepted
offers unless they clearly indicate that they are not accepting or
that they are making counter-offers. By refusing to give effect to
technical, ambiguous responses, courts promote the underlying
In the first place, good drafting calls for good lawyers and decent drafting calls for
representation of both or all interests by good lawyers. It is an unfortunate situation
which limits the availability of respectable law or legally effective regulation to persons,
especially to corporations who have managed to accumulate experience enough to learn
that the "general" rules are unsatisfactory, and who have money enough to hire skilled
counsel, and sense enough to find such. It is an unfortunate legal situation which puts
it into the hands of any outfit that can get the jump on its customer (as, for instance,
by "our standard form") or which can get the jump on whole categories of customers
(as by an automobile manufacturers' association standard form or a seed dealers' stan-
dard form) to twist the neck of commercial decency at any legal time or in any legal
manner it may choose. For it is the societal function of private law, as of public law, to
provide ring, referee and rules. Let the best outfit win, indeed let ring-strategy and
careful training count. But are feather-weights to be matched against unlimited heav-
ies, and is the use, by one party, of the knee or foot to be allowable with no fouls
called? New York, in 1820, gives one, on the civil side, and on quality a pre-ring, pre-
matchmaker, pre-Marquis of Queensbury picture. Catch-weights, all comers, no holds
barred. 1900-1910 (the Sales Act being adopted in the last year mentioned) represents
a movement in the direction of a Boxing Commission. There is said to be dirty work
and manipulating in the fight game; I do not know. What is certain is that the spread-
ing vogue of draftsmanship has carried lopsided manipulation into the game of Sales
Law. I hold the draftsman's to be a noble art .... Form-contracts can do, in the legal
and marketing phases, almost as useful work as the conveyor-belt. The draftsman's art
can be dastardly as well as noble ....
Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality and Society: II, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341, 393-94 (1937)
(emphasis in original).
164. Itoh, 552 F.2d at 1238.
165. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 20, 57; and 61; see also supra note
114. For an analysis of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) concept of standardized agreements with
particular reference to 2-207, see Murray, The Standardized Agreement, supra note 9, at
744-61.
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philosophy of Article 2, serve the essential purpose of 2-207, and
maintain absolute fidelity to the overriding standards of good faith
and conscionability. In sum, the courts effect the factual bargain of
the parties as reasonably understood and fairly interpreted by
merchants.
D. A Current Example
Lest any doubt remain concerning the pervasive confusion in
current judicial thinking about the counter-offer riddle, a recent
example provides ample support for this assertion. In Salt River
Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District v. Westing-
house Electric Corp.166 the utility buyer (SRP) sent a purchase or-
der to Westinghouse containing the following provision, which was
the first paragraph in its "Terms and Conditions":
This Purchase Order becomes a binding contract, subject to the terms and
conditions hereof, upon receipt by Buyer and its Purchasing Department of
the acknowledgment copy hereof, signed by Seller, or upon commencement of
performance by Seller, whichever occurs first. Acceptance of this Purchase
Order must be made on its exact terms and if additional or different terms
are proposed by Seller such response will constitute a counter-offer, and no
contract shall come into existence without Buyer's written assent to the
counter-offer. Buyer's acceptance of or payment for material shipped shall
constitute acceptance of such material subject to the provisions herein, only,
and shall not constitute acceptance of any counter-offer by Seller not as-
sented to in writing.8 7
The drafter of this provision apparently made every effort to
win the battle of the forms. Westinghouse could exercise the power
of acceptance in one of two ways: by signing the acknowledgment
form drafted by the purchaser or by starting performance. If the
seller returns acknowledgment with different or additional terms,
the response will not constitute an acceptance-it will be a
counter-offer. Even if the buyer accepts a shipment of goods, the
acceptance of goods will not accept any counter-offer from the ven-
dor because only a written assent by the purchaser can bind him to
the vendor's counter-offer. As is often true, the seller in this case
ignored the acknowledgment form sent by the buyer with the
purchase order. Instead, the seller sent its own printed acknowl-
edgment form, which indicated that the purchase order "[hiad
been entered."168 The acknowledgment contained the usual direc-
166. 143 Ariz. 437, 694 P.2d 267 (Ct. App. 1983) modified en banc, 143 Ariz. 368, 694
P.2d 198 (1984).
167. Id. at 440, 694 P.2d at 270.
168. Id.
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tive: "SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR TERMS AND CONDITIONS."
The Westinghouse "Terms and Conditions" began with a preamble
indicating that the seller's conditions "shall take precedence over
any conditions which may appear on your standard form, and no
provisions or condition of such form except as expressly stated
herein, shall be binding on Westinghouse. 1 6 9 While it is possible
to find some precedent that would characterize this clause as suffi-
ciently indicating an expressly conditional acceptance, the clause is
hardly similar to the statutory proviso language required by Itoh,
Uniroyal, or Dorton. °70 If the Dorton-Itoh- Uniroyal precedent
controlled, the clause would not create a statutory counter-offer.
The usual warranty disclaimers and limitations of liability followed
the preamble in the Westinghouse form. The dickered terms were
identical on the purchaser's and seller's forms. Westinghouse
shipped the equipment ordered, and the buyer used it. Later, the
buyer alleged that the equipment malfunctioned and caused con-
siderable damage. The buyer alleged breaches of warranties, and
Westinghouse relied on the warranty disclaimers in its acknowl-
edgment form as a defense.
The court interpreted the purchase order as requiring an ac-
ceptance that exactly matched the terms of the offer. Because the
Westinghouse response failed to match all terms, it was not an ac-
ceptance. Rather, it was a counter-offer. Having characterized the
Westinghouse response as a counter-offer, the court rejected the
argument that the purchase order terms concerning the manner of
accepting the counter-offer could control, because the counter-offer
necessarily rejected that term of the offer. Yet Westinghouse's re-
sponse was not a counter-offer because it expressly conditioned ac-
ceptance on assent to the terms of the response. According to the
court, this case did not even fall within 2-207 because "[t]he SRP
order distinctly stated that a responsive document containing any
different or additional terms would operate as a counter-offer and
could not be an acceptance of the SRP offer.' ' 7 1 The court held
the SRP offer to be the rare offer unambiguously requiring an ex-
clusive manner of acceptance under 2-206 of the Code, thereby re-
stricting the manner of acceptance to terms exactly matching the
terms of the offer. Thus, the printed clause in the purchase order
precluded a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance with
169. Id.
170. For an analysis of these cases, see supra text accompanying notes 95-132.
171. 143 Ariz. at 444, 694 P.2d at 274.
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different or additional terms. By accepting the goods, the buyer
had accepted the counter-offer. 17 2
The first reaction to this bizarre situation may be to regard
the buyer's draftsman as a classic illustration of one who, in Llew-
ellyn's words, tried to "draft to the edge of the possible"173 and was
hoisted on his own excessively drafted petard. Further reflection,
however, reveals a more troubling analysis. If the purchase order
had contained no such printed clause or one that merely sought to
take advantage of 2-207(2)(a), the court may well have character-
ized the seller's response as a definite and seasonable expression of
acceptance forming a contract on the buyer's terms with variant
terms excised under 2-207(2). If the seller had used a statutory
counter-offer clause tracking the statutory proviso of 2-207(1), the
resulting contract by conduct would have included terms favorable
to the buyer under 2-207(3). In Salt River the seller's form is not a
counter-offer by its own language. Instead, it becomes a counter-
offer by unread language in the buyer's purchase order. Section 2-
207 has no application. Salt River thus provides the most recent
example of the "last shot" principle. The seller won the battle of
the forms without assistance from 2-207. Viewing the court as un-
tutored and unwise in its failure to analyze the situation more ef-
fectively under the current, disparate case law is too facile. In-
stead, this kind of analysis may appear at any time because of
chaotic judicial interpretations in this area. Salt River may even be
an example of a court making valiant efforts to avoid 2-207 appli-
cations. At this judicial moment in the land of 2-207, that motiva-
tion would not be remarkable.
V. THE "DIFFERENT" VS. "ADDITIONAL" PUZZLE
Section 2-207(1) permits an operative acceptance that contains
different or additional terms. 74 If the response to an offer is such
an acceptance, what should be the effect of the additional or differ-
ent terms? The drafters clearly designed subsection (2) exclusively
to deal with a situation in which an offeree sends a definite and
seasonable expression of acceptance and forms a contract although
the acceptance contained terms not found in the offer. This radical
departure from pre-Code contract law demanded statutory guid-
172. The court held that "[w]here, as here, an offeree uses a seller's goods for his own
purposes, that action will be deemed to constitute an acceptance of the terms of the
counter-offer." Id.
173. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
174. For text of 2-207(1) see supra note 2.
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ance in dealing with nonmatching terms in the acceptance. The
statutory guidance, however, has caused consternation. While sub-
section (2) includes the word "additional," it fails to include the
word "different." 178 What should be done with "different" terms?
To have statutory guidance concerning one kind of nonmatching
term but not the other is particularly odd. Did the drafters intend
subsection (2) to apply only to additional terms and therefore de-
liberately avoid any mention of different terms? The Comments to
2-207 answer these and other perplexing questions emanating from
the failure to mention "different."
Comment 3 is particularly helpful in solving the puzzle. It
states: "Whether or not additional or different terms will become
part of the agreement depends upon the provisions of Subsection
(2). ''176 This introductory sentence to Comment 3 argues mightily
for the explanation, suggested by some commentators and courts,
that the failure to include "different" along with "additional" in
subsection (2) is an inadvertent drafting or printing error.177 The
appearance of Comment 3 at a particular time in the statutory his-
tory supports this view,1 78 and other drafting history also suggests
this resolution. 79 Contrary suggestions, however, are also found in
175. For text of 2-207(2) see supra note 2.
176. U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 3 (1977).
177. See, e.g., Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 141 Cal. Rptr. 157, 569 P.2d 751 (1977);
Murray, Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 5, at 619; Utz, More on the Battle of the
Forms: The Treatment of "Different" Terms Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 16
U.C.C. L.J. 103, 105 (1983).
178. Utz, supra note 1775, at 111-12. Comment 3, which assumes that both "different"
and "additional" appear in 2-207(2), first appeared in the Final Text edition of November
1951. That same edition dropped the reference to "different" in 2-207(2), but retained it in
2-207(1). "Different" had first appeared in the June 1951 redraft in both subsections (1) and
(2), which reflected changes made by the Joint Meeting of the Institute and the Commis-
sioners in May 1951.
179. In a May 1951 meeting of the American Law Institute in Joint Session with the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, it was proposed that "differ-
ent" be added to both subsections (1) and (2) of 2-207. See Transcript of Proceedings of the
Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute in Joint Session with the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 27-28 (May 16-18, 1951). Llewellyn noted
that change during the meeting with an indication that the change had been adopted. See
The Karl Llewellyn Papers, J.XIII. l.a (available in University of Chicago Law Library); see
also, The American Law Institute & National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, May Meeting Revisions to Proposed Final Draft
No. 2, at 6 (June, 1951) (containing the amendment to both subsections (1) and (2), re-
printed in XII UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DArs 323, 328 (E. Kelley compiler 1984). For
suggested analyses of why the November, 1951 Final Text Edition and the 1952 Official
Draft did not include "different" in subsection (2), see supra notes 174-78 and accompany-
ing text.
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the drafting history 5 0 Although the arguments in favor of the in-
advertent error seem more plausible, the drafting history is not
dispositive. Because Comment 3 is not statutory language, it has
been ignored by some courts and commentators."8 ' Professors
White and Summers have influenced some courts to adopt the
view that subsection (2) does not apply to "different" terms. 182
White and Summers, however, disagree on the proper treatment of
"different" terms in an otherwise definite and seasonable expres-
sion of acceptance. White argues that a term in the offer cancels
any different term in the acceptance: a view that has been chris-
tened the "knockout" view. 83 Summers contends that different
terms in the acceptance simply "fall out."' 18 4 The inclusion of an
arbitration term in the offer and an anti-arbitration term in the
acceptance illustrates the difference in these views. Under the
White "knockout" view, the contract would contain no arbitration
clause because the different express terms eliminate each other.
Under the Summers "fall out" view, the contract would contain an
arbitration clause because the different term in the acceptance
180. Professors Baird and Weisberg recognize the drafting history suggested supra
note 179, but point to a statement from Karl Llewellyn opposing the addition of "different"
terms in subsection (2), which he withdrew after remarks by Soia Mentschikoff. See Tran-
script of Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute in Joint Session
with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 27-28 (May 16-18,
1951). Notwithstanding Dean Mentschikoff's suggestion that "different" may be included in
subsection (2) without difficulty, Professors Baird and Weisberg suggest that her remarks:
only argue for including "different" in subsection (1), not for including them in subsec-
tion (2), in which they would be "proposals". She seems to suggest that when there is
no agreement on a particular term, neither party's term controls. It is possible that the
drafters recognized this between the May meeting and the November draft and took
"different" out of subsection (2) for this reason.
BAIRD & WEISBERG, supra note 5, at 1241 n.61.
181. See, e.g., Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569 (10th Cir. 1984); Duesen-
berg, supra note 5, at 1485, 1488.
182. See, e.g., Daitom, 741 F.2d at 1579 (reflecting White view that conflicting terms
cancel each other out); Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.
1979) (White view); Reaction Molding Technologies, Inc. v. General Elec. Co., 588 F. Supp.
1280 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (reflecting Summers' view that different terms in the acceptance fall
out); Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Sonic Dev. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 533 (D. Kan. 1982)
(White view); Lea Tal Textile Co. v. Manning Fabrics, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1404 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (White view); Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply, Inc., 98
Idaho 495, 567 P.2d 1246 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1056 (1978) (White view); Challenge
Mach. Co. v. Mattison Mach. Works, 138 Mich. App. 15, 359 N.W.2d 232, 39 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 157 (Ct. App. 1984) (White view); Hartwig Farms, Inc. v. Pacific Gamble
Robinson Co., 28 Wash. App. 539, 625 P.2d 171 (Ct. App. 1981) (in dictum); S.C. Gray, Inc.
v. Ford Motor Co., 92 Mich. App. 789, 286 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1979) (White View).
183. J. WHITE & R. SumRSa, supra note 6, at 29.
184. Id.
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simply falls out.
Professor White relies on Comment 6 to 2-207 to support the
"knockout" view,185 but his coauthor reminds him that Comment 6
deals only with "confirming forms."' 86 Because White ignores the
clear inclusion of "different" along with "additional" in Comment
3, his reliance on Comment 6, which expressly is limited to a situa-
tion different from the illustration, is problematic. Although the
"knockout" view has found judicial support,187 scholars have recog-
nized the difficulty in relying on Comment 6.188 Under Summers'
"fall out" view, the offeror wins the battle of the forms concerning
arbitration.' 89 White complains that this view gives the offeror an
"unearned advantage."' 90 Summers responds that the advantage is
not entirely unearned because the offeree did have the benefit of
perusing the offeror's terms and could have refused to contract ab-
sent express assent to his no arbitration term.'9 ' Summers, how-
ever, is discontent with his own "fall out" view any time the offer
includes implied terms, as he suspects it often does. If an offer con-
tains implied terms, any expressly different term in the accept-
ance, under his prescription, simply will "fall out," and the offeror
invariably will win the battle of the forms. In some frustration,
185. U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 6 reads:
If no answer is received within a reasonable time after additional terms are proposed, it
is both fair and commercially sound to assume that their inclusion has been assented
to. Where clauses on confirming forms sent by both parties conflict each party must be
assumed to object to a clause of the other conflicting with one on the confirmation sent
by himself. As a result the requirement that there be notice of objection which is found
in subsection (2) is satisfied and the conflicting, terms do not become a part of the
contract. The contract then consists of the terms originally expressly agreed to, terms
on which the confirmations agree, and terms supplied by this Act, including subsection
(2). The written confirmation is also subject to Section 2-201. Under that section a
failure to respond permits enforcement of a prior oral agreement; under this section a
failure to respond permits additional terms to become part of the agreement.
186. J. WHITE & R SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 29.
187. See supra note 180.
188. See Duesenberg, supra note 5, at 1485.
That comment purports to explain subsection (2), not subsection (3). In this effort, it
lacks desired clarity. It starts by saying that failure to answer an additional term re-
sults in its being assented to-which is not true except as to immaterial additional
terms, and even then, not always. Next, it says that conflicting terms in written confir-
mations are stricken, with the Code filling the gaps-which also is not true under sub-
section (2), but may be true under subsection (3). As a comment on the section, this is
a poor one.
Id.
189. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 29. For a case adopting the Summers
"fall-out" view, see Reaction Molding, 588 F. Supp. at 1289.
190. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 29.
191. Id.
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Summers suggests his only solution to this dilemma-redraft the
statute. 19 2 The problem of implied terms in the offer is overcome
under the "knockout" view because neither conflicting term be-
comes part of the contract.
Professor White, however, is uncomfortable with his "knock-
out" view as applied to another situation: one in which the offer
contains an arbitration term, but the acceptance is silent. In this
situation Summers happily finds an arbitration term in the result-
ing contract, this time more easily because the acceptance did not
conflict expressly with the term in the offer. Both authors suggest
that, despite the argument that this result gives the offeror an
unearned advantage, the resulting contract should include the ar-
bitration term because "[tierms contained in his [offeror's/buyer's]
document which are not contradicted by the acceptance become
part of the contract."'1 3 Presumably, the authors believe that the
lack of an express anti-arbitration clause in the acceptance sug-
gests that the acceptance does not "contradict" the terms of the
offer. The next sentence in their text, however, is paradoxical: "If
White were more bold, he would find that seller's [offeree's] docu-
ment is only an 'acceptance' of those terms on which both docu-
ments agree."'194 If both documents do not agree, do they not con-
tain a "contradiction"? Are White and Summers suggesting that
the acceptance does not "contradict" the offer because it does not
contradict the offer expressly? We are told that White is not
"more bold" because nothing in the Code or the statutory history
supports the position that the resulting contract in this illustration
should not contain an arbitration clause. 95 Nonetheless, White
"would write the law differently if he could do so."' 98 The authors
of an otherwise helpful text seem terribly confused in this area.
No basis exists for suggesting that the Code drafters deliber-
ately avoided the use of "different" in subsection (2) or anywhere
else in 2-207. Suggestions that the statutory language requires the
exclusion of "different" terms from the operation of subsection (2)
are less than plausible. For example, Professor Summers believes
that 2-207(2)(c) "confirms that the drafters did not envision the
possibility that a contract could include 'different' terms on the
192. Id. at 30.
193. Id. at 31.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
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same matter." 197 Subsections 2-207(2) and (2)(c) provide:
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract un-
less:... (c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.198
Summers concludes that 2-207(2)(c) "would automatically eject
the different term in the acceptance, since 'notification of objec-
tion' would already have been given when the offeror included the
contrary term initially."' 99 Section 2-207(2)(c), however, envisions
either prior notification of objection to nonmatching terms or sub-
sequent notification of objection within a reasonable time after the
response containing nonmatching terms is received. If Summers'
view were followed, the language after the disjunctive in 2-
207(2)(c) would be useless because the offer always would consti-
tute a notification of objection to any nonmatching term in the
acceptance.
The purpose of 2-207(2) must be examined to determine the
section's potential applicability to "different" as well as "addi-
tional" terms. Subsection (2) begins with the innocuous statement:
"The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addi-
tion to the contract. 2 00 Without the next sentence, no additional
term would become part of the contract unless the offeror assented
to that term. If the additional term occurs in a contract between
merchants, the angular phraseology of subsection (2) suggests that
the additional terms become part of the contract, unless: (1) the
offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; (2) the
additional terms materially alter the contract; or (3) notification of
objection to the additional terms has already been given or is given
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.20 1 These
mutually exclusive exceptions clearly tend to swallow the general
rule of subsection (2) that "between merchants such terms become
part of the contract. .. ." If the variant term materially alters a
term of the offer, 2-207(2)(b) applies and subsections 2(a) or 2(c)
are not needed. If the offeror has taken advantage of subsection
2(a) by inserting an express limitation to the terms of the offer, the
limitation is superfluous if the additional term is "material" as a
matter of law. Because several 2-207 cases deal with the question
197. Id. at 27 n.7.
198. U.C.C. § 2-207(2), (2)(c) (1977).
199. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 27 n.7.
200. U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (1977).
201. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(a)-(c) (1977).
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of materiality,202 however, controversy over materiality can be
avoided by including a clause meeting the requirements of 2-
207(2)(a). Subsection (2)(a) precludes any additional term regard-
less of materiality. Similarly, including a notice of objection in the
offer under 2-207(2)(c) effectively precludes any additional term
regardless of materiality. Absent these clauses in the offer and ab-
sent a material additional term, the offeror still may avoid an addi-
tional term by notifying the offeree of objection within a reasona-
ble time after receipt of the acceptance containing the immaterial,
additional term. Section 2-207(2) may be redundant to some ex-
tent,2 03 but its operation can be made effective. Yet the technical
application of subsection (2) does not reveal its underlying philoso-
phy, which is simply a specification of the underlying philosophy of
2-207 and all of Article 2.
The primary purpose of 2-207 is avoiding oppression and un-
fair surprise.20 4 To avoid imposing on an offeror a term in a printed
form that would unfairly surprise or oppress the offeror, one
should be concerned only with terms that will affect the offer sub-
stantially-terms that will "materially alter" the deal proposed by
the offeror. 20 5 True to the Code's emphasis on the offeror as master
202. See Twin Disc, Inc. v. Big Bud Tractor, 772 F.2d 1329, 1334 (7th Cir. 1985) (war-
ranty disclaimer constitutes material alteration); Luedtke Eng'g Co. v. Indiana Limestone
Co., 740 F.2d 598, 600-01 (7th Cir. 1984) (delivery term considered material alteration);
Western Indus., Inc. v. Newcor Canada, Ltd., 739 F.2d 1198, 1205 (7th Cir. 1984) (deletion
of major remedy such as consequential damages constitutes material alteration); Frances
Hosiery Mills Inc. v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 285 N.C. 344, 356-57, 204 S.E.2d 834, 842
(1974) (arbitration term constitutes material alteration). But see Kathenes v. Quick Chek
Food Stores, 596 F. Supp. 713, 718 (D.N.J. 1984) (exclusion of consequential damages not a
material alteration).
203. If an offer expressly limited acceptance to the terms of the offer and also included
notification of objection to any variant terms in the acceptance, the offer would seek to take
advantage of both 2-207(2)(a) and 2-207(2)(c). The express limitation, however, could be
considered a notification of objection to variant terms and the ratification of objection could
be construed as an express limitation to the terms of the offer.
204. Comment 4 to 2-207 suggests that the test for a material alteration is whether the
variant term in the acceptance would "result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without
express awareness by the other party . . . ." comment 5, dealing with immaterial altera-
tions, suggests the converse, i.e., "clauses which involve no element of unreasonable surprise
and which therefore are to be incorporated in the contract unless notice of objection is rea-
sonably given ....
Cases testing the materiality of the alteration in terms of unreasonable surprise or
hardship include Luedtke Eng'g Co. v. Indiana Limestone Co., 740 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir.
1984) and Ebasco Servs., Inc., v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 402 F. Supp. 421, 442
(E.D. Pa. 1975). Cf. U. C. C. § 2-302 comment. 1 (1977) (suggesting that the principle of
unconscionability "is one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise .... "; see
Murray, Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 5.
205. For cases using the standard of oppression and unfair surprise as test of material-
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of the offer,208 the offeror may avoid even immaterial additional
terms by inserting in the offer limitations on the offeree's power of
acceptance in the form of either an express limitation to the terms
of the offer under 2-207(2)(a) or notification of objection under
(2)(c). If a material term became part of the contract, however, it
would interfere substantially with the offeror's reasonable expecta-
tions. Moreover, if a material term became part of the contract
contrary to the reasonable understanding of the offeror, the result
would be oppression, hardship, or unfair surprise to the of-
feror-the essential evil to be avoided. 7 Comments 3, 4, and 5 to
2-207 emphasize the concept of materiality and suggest as illustra-
tions clauses that normally would be thought materially to alter
the terms of the offer and clauses that would be viewed as immate-
rial additions to the contract. Binding the offeror to a contract
containing a material term not found in the offer would bind him
to a bargain he never made, rather than to the factual bargain he
thought he was initiating when he created the power of acceptance.
Considering the illustrations in Comments 4 and 5 to 2-207
that suggest material versus immaterial alterations is particularly
interesting. Comment 4's first illustration of a material alteration
is "a clause negating such standard warranties as that of
merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose in circumstances
in which either warranty normally attaches."20 8 That, absent trade
usage or prior course of dealing, the warranty of merchantability2 "
always attaches is a normative assumption of Article 2. Because
the warranty is implied, is an express disclaimer in an otherwise
definite expression of acceptance an "additional" or "different"
term? Unless the implied warranty is excluded from the offer, the
ity, see supra, note 200.
206. The original Restatement of Contracts contained one exception to the general
rule that the offeror is master of the offer. Under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
the rule is absolute. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
207. Comment 4 is particularly clear about the essential evil to be avoided, i.e., mate-
rial alterations would "result in surprise or hardship if incorporated without express aware-
ness by the other party. . . ." U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 4 (1977).
208. U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 4 (1977).
209. Under § 2-316(3)(c), the implied warranty of merchantability may be excluded or
modified by course of dealing, course of performance, or usage of trade. Course of perform-
ance would exclude or modify the implied warranty only because the parties acted as if
there were no implied warranty in their initial performance of the contract. Trade usage or
prior course of dealing effectively could exclude the implied warranty at the moment the
contract was formed. It is of critical importance to include trade usage, course of dealing, or
course of performance as part of the factual bargain constituting the "agreement" of the
parties under § 1-201(3).
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disclaimer must be a "different" term, which the Comment as-
sumes to be within the scope of 2-207(2).210 This result is not re-
markable because the previous Comment assumes that subsection
(2) applies to different as well as additional terms. If subsection (2)
does not apply to "different" terms like warranty disclaimers, rem-
edy limitations, or other terms that materially alter the terms of
the offer, a great deal of case law is removed from the scope of
subsection (2). The remaining illustrations of material alterations
in Comment 4 deal with terms in the acceptance that are different
from terms implied in the offer through trade usage or prior course
of dealing. Again, they are all "different" terms. Comment 4 pro-
vides no illustration of a term that is both additional and not
different.
Comment 5 to 2-207 contains examples of clauses involving no
element of unreasonable surprise or hardship; they are immaterial
terms in the acceptance. The first example is a clause enlarging
slightly upon those situations that allow a se11er to claim an ex-
emption for commercial impracticability and that are "similar to
those covered by"2 ': the Code section on impracticability.2 12 If this
illustration suggests that a term in an acceptance may expand im-
practicability beyond the terms of the offer, it may be nothing
more than a suggestion that the seller does not lose the Code stan-
dard of impracticability unless the offer clearly reduces that stan-
dard. In that sense, the clause is neither an additional nor a differ-
ent term. "[A] clause fixing a reasonable time for complaints
within customary limits ' s may be thought to be an additional
term only in the sense that it specifies a period within the scope of
the period authorized by the offer. Certainly, it is not a "different"
term, although it may be characterized as "additional." In the case
of a purchase for subsale, a term providing for inspection by a sub-
purchaser would not be a "different" term, although it may be an
additional term of insignificance to the offeror, who may have ex-
pected the inspection. Added terms within the range of trade prac-
tice are certainly not "different" terms, nor is a "clause limiting
the right of rejection for defects" within trade usage a "different"
term.
Comment 5's only illustration of immaterial terms that is
troubling deals with "limiting remedy in a reasonable manner"
210. U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 4 (1977).
211. U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 5 (1977).
212. U.C.C. § 2-615 (1977).
213. U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 5 (1977).
1362 [Vol. 39:1307
1986] BATTLE OF THE FORMS 1363
with reference to sections 2-718 and 2-719.114 Absent trade usage or
prior course of dealing permitting the limitation of remedy, the in-
clusion of a liquidated damages clause in an acceptance typically
would alter the terms of the offer materially. If the Comment's
phrase, "in a reasonable manner," is interpreted as a clause that
specifies liquidated damages within a range contemplated in the
offer, the term is immaterially additional and not different. Simi-
larly, a limitation of remedy consonant with trade usage or prior
course of dealing would not be a "different" term though it may be
additional. On the other hand, any substantial change in the nor-
mal remedies an offeror would expect in the event of a breach
would be a materially different term notwithstanding some recent
dreadful judicial analysis.215
Courts and scholars have recognized the difficulty in distin-
214. Id. Section 2-718 deals with liquidation or limitation of damages and section 2-
719 deals with contractual modification or limitation of remedy.
215. An opinion holding a consequential damage clause in the seller's form to be an
immaterial alteration that becomes part of the contract signals an unfortunate development.
In Hydraform Prods. Corp. v. American Steel & Aluminum Corp., 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1201 (N.H. 1985), the New Hampshire Supreme Court held the exclusionary
clause enforceable because it appeared in a delivery receipt signed by the buyer's agents.
The opinion relies upon language in comment 5 that suggests that "a remedy may be lim-
ited in a reasonable manner (see Sections 2-718 and 2-719)." U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 5. The
court quoted section 2-719 and suggested that subsection (3) provides that an exclusion of a
consequential damages term is enforceable unless unconscionable. Hydraform Prods. Corp.,
41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 1205. Because the clause was not unconscionable in this merchant
transaction, the court somehow concluded that it was an immaterial alteration. The court
ignored the threshold question of whether the parties agreed to the exclusion of consequent-
ial damages. Rather, simply because 2-719(3) permits parties to agree to exclude conse-
quential damages, the court found the allowed exclusion to constitute an immaterial altera-
tion, a non sequitur. Sellers in New Hampshire now may insert exclusionary clauses in all
delivery receipts and hope that they are signed by an employee of the buyer who may be
totally unaware of the significance of the form that he is signing and who certainly is una-
ware of the consequences of this surreptitious clause. Another curiosity in this opinion is the
suggestion that the parties previously had formed a contract, but that the clause was en-
forceable as part of the contract in the subsequent delivery receipt. If the contract was
formed by shipment of the goods under section 2-206(2), the delivery order should have
been viewed as superfluous to the terms of the contract. It is difficult to view the delivery
receipt as a document manifesting a good faith modification of the contract under section 2-
209(1). Finally, even if it were viewed as a confirmation of the existing contract, such a
different term in the delivery order should not become part of the contract unless it is an
immaterial alteration. See Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc., 723 F.2d 758 (10th Cir.
1983). In Transamerica Oil the court, relying upon Album Graphics, Inc. v. Beatrice Foods
Co., 87 Ill. App. 3d 338, 408 N.E.2d 1041, 30 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 53 (1980), held
that, although a particular limitation of remedy clause was not unconscionable, a limitation
of remedy generally constitutes a material alteration unless the buyer expressly agrees to
the limitation.
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guishing additional from different terms. 16 Some also have recog-
nized that the elimination of "different" terms from subsection (2)
emasculates that subsection, because so many terms in responses
to offers are necessarily different.217 If the typical offer from a
buyer contains implied terms, the comprehensive nature of these
terms may not be recognized fully. Although everyone may recog-
nize a disclaimer of warranty or an exclusion of consequential
damages as different terms in the response to the offer, some may
not recognize an arbitration clause in the response as a different
rather than additional term. The Code is silent on arbitration. It is
not silent, however, on the available judicial remedies in the event
of breach. An arbitration clause in the response changes the offer.
Absent trade usage or prior course of dealing that would include
arbitration in the offer, it is difficult to conceive of a more material
change in the response than a clause that would remove the judi-
cial remedies normally included in a contract for the sale of goods.
The extreme limitation upon the operation of subsection (2) that
would result from the elimination of "different" terms is the basis
of a persuasive argument for the inclusion of "different" terms in
the operation of the subsection. The emphasis on the materiality
of nonmatching terms in the acceptance, however, provides the ba-
sis for a more startling and conclusive argument for the inclusion
of "different" terms in subsection (2).
An additional term does not change the offer in the sense of
altering it. If the additional term becomes part of the contract, it
typically will delineate the terms originally proposed by the of-
feror. Suggesting a thesis that allows for no exception is always
dangerous. On the basis of extant case law and innumerable hy-
potheticals, however, it is appropriate to suggest that no illustra-
tion of a nonmatching term in an acceptance is both material and
additional without being different. If a so-called additional term is
also material in that it creates hardship and unfair surprise to the
offeror, it is by definition different. The heart of subsection (2) is
subsection (2)(b). Subsection (2)(b) would excise terms that mate-
rially alter the offer absent any clause in the offer limiting accept-
ance to the terms of the offer or anticipatorily objecting to variant
216. See Daitom, 741 F.2d at 1578-79, 39 U.C.C. Rep. at 1217 (10th Cir. 1984);
Steiner, 569 P.2d at 759-60 n.5; Boise-Hilburn Co. v. Dean Mach. Co., 616 S.W.2d 520, 527
(Mo. Ct. App. 1981); see also R. ALDERMAN, supra note 93, at 21 n.54; Murray, Incipient
Unconscionability, supra note 5, at 618-20 n.57; Utz, supra note 175, at 115; Duesenberg,
supra note 5, at 1483-88.
217. See Utz, supra note 175, at 116.
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terms. A material alteration cannot be imposed on an offeror who
would be unfairly surprised and oppressed. A common definition of
"alter" is "to change, to make different."2 18 Because the term "al-
ter" is part of the statutory language, exclusive reliance upon the
Comments to include "different" terms in 2-207(2) is no longer
necessary. Moreover, even if "alter" were not part of the statutory
language, the dominant intention to exclude material changes in
the acceptance cannot be emphasized too strongly. Any material
change necessarily would be a different term in the acceptance.
This analysis suggests the concomitant analysis concerning addi-
tional terms. If a term in the acceptance properly is characterized
as additional and not different, this additional term necessarily is
an immaterial term that, between merchants, would become part
of the contract. 19 While the statutory language of subsection (2) is
neither clear nor, to use a computerism, "user friendly," the under-
lying philosophy of 2-207 leads us to conclude without hesitation
that the failure to include "different" terms in subsection (2)
would emasculate the subsection's purpose-the avoidance of
hardship and unfair surprise. The failure to include "different"
terms would permit enforcement of technical bargains differing
substantially from the factual bargains intended by the parties.
If "different" terms are included in subsection (2), they will be
excised from the definite and seasonable expression of acceptance.
This consequence is another evil that has been recognized in both
case law and legal commentaries-the offeror always wins. It is
particularly important to confront this final enigma of 2-207: How
can we prevent a result conditioned on the accident of which party
happened to be the offeror?
218. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 63 (1965).
219. Support for this analysis comes from Karl Llewellyn:
Some improvement is to be hoped for from the provision of Sec. 2-207(2) which allows
minor additional terms to enter into the contract without that express consent which
(more frequently than not) never occurs. What terms will be construed as "materially"
altering the contract is . . .a question for the courts' determination.
1954 Law Revision Commission Hearings, supra note 16, at 56 (120). With respect to terms
that "materially alter" the offer, Llewellyn not only felt that they should not enter the re-
sulting contract; he also insisted, like his insistence that unconscionability question be judi-
cially determined (§ 2-302(1)), that the court determine whether an "alteration" is material.
The result will be "precedent"-a judicial elaboration to guide merchants. See supra note
64. Presumably, Llewellyn not only knew that "alter" meant "different"; he suggested the
distinction made in this Article's text between immaterial additional terms and material
altering, and hence different, terms.
13651986]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
VI. THE FINAL ENIGMA
Even among commentators who believe that they have unrav-
eled the mysteries of 2-207, there remains a sense of uneasiness. 2 0
If this Article's suggestions to this point are accepted as solving the
"counter-offer riddle" and the "'different' vs. 'additional' puzzle,"
we still are left with the discomforting fact that an otherwise sound
analysis of 2-207 always seems to protect the offeror-a result that
is somewhat uncomfortable for Professor Summers and distressing
to Professor White. Consider the following possibilities:
(1) A purchase order is construed as an offer. It is silent con-
cerning warranties, remedies, and arbitration. The response to the
offer is the seller's typical acknowledgment containing a disclaimer
of implied warranties, an exclusion of consequential damages, and
an arbitration clause. The acknowledgment, however, contains no
counter-offer language-neither a clear and understandable state-
ment of counter-offer nor the ambiguous statutory proviso lan-
guage expressly conditioning acceptance on the buyer's assent to
the seller's terms. The dickered terms in the forms are identical.
The response is a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance.
The additional or different terms in the response are either mate-
rial alterations, which are excised between merchants under 2-
207(2)(b), or they are subject to the "knockout" 221 or "fall out ' 222
views, which preclude application of 2-207(2) to "different" terms.
In any event, the additional or different terms in the response do
not become part of the contract.
(2) The same buyer sends the same purchase order with re-
spect to the same deal. In this case, however, the seller sent his
form first, a "quotation" construed to be an offer. Although
purchase orders appear to be offers, courts will construe them as
acceptances if the parties "intended" that effect.223 The seller's
clauses are printed on the "quotation" form exactly as they ap-
220. The most candid recognition of analytical difficulties with respect to 2-207 is
found in J. WHrTE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 24-39. See supra text accompanying
notes 183-92.
221. See supra text accompanying note 183.
222. See supra text accompanying note 184.
223. See, e.g., Daitom, 741 F.2d at 1575-76; Mead Corp. v. McNally-Pittsburg Mfg.
Corp., 654 F.2d 1197 (6th Cir. 1981); Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 596 F.2d
924 (9th Cir. 1979); Earl M. Jorgenson Co. v. Mark Const., Inc., 56 Hawaii 466, 540 P.2d 978
(1975). In particular, see Phillips Petroleum Co., Norway v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 125 Wis. 2d
418, 373 N.W.2d 65, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1192 (Ct. App. 1985), rev'd on other
grounds, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 667 (Wis. Sup. Ct. 1986), discussed infra note
225.
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peared on the acknowledgment in situation (1). Now, however, the
quotation form is an offer, which has been accepted by the
purchase order .If the purchase order is construed as containing
the usual implied terms that it clearly would have been said to
contain as an offer, the purchase order contains "different"
terms-implied warranties, an implication of normal Code reme-
dies including consequential damages, and a consequent negation
of arbitration. The purchase order will be construed as a definite
and seasonable expression of acceptance. Current case law will find
a contract on the seller's terms because the seller happened to be
the offeror.224 If "different" terms are considered within the scope
of 2-207(2), any implied "different" terms contained in the
purchase order will be excised under 2-207(2)(b). An interpretation
of subsection (2) that precludes its application to "different" terms
produces three possible results: (a) the different implied terms in
the purchase order acceptance merely "fall out" and the terms of
the offer prevail-Professor Summers' position; (b) the silent
purchase order does not contradict the terms of the offer and the
terms of the offer prevail-the timid Professor White view; or (c)
the implied terms of the purchase order acceptance are different
from the terms of the offer, and different terms simply cancel each
other out. The last result reflects the literal "knockout" view that a
"more bold" Professor White should apply, but does not, allegedly
because nothing in the statute or the statutory history permits this
result. If the purchase order acceptance expressly included Code
warranties, a consequential damages clause, and an anti-arbitra-
tion clause, White would insist on applying his "knockout" view.
What would be the result, however, if the purchase order had in-
cluded an express but general statement of the retention of Code
warranties and remedies?
A recent case may reflect more closely the "more bold" posi-
tion from which Professor White retreated. In Daitom, Inc. v.
Pennwalt Corporation21 5 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals con-
224. See, e.g., Daitom, 741 F.2d at 1575-76 (seller submitted proposal, which court
deemed to be offer, and buyer's purchase order constituted acceptance); Mead Corp., 654
F.2d at 1202-04 (bid proposal from seller construed to be offer and purchase order construed
as acceptance because purchase order clearly indicated an assent to terms as specified on
face of form); Idaho Power, 596 F.2d at 925-26 (price quotation was offer and purchase
order was acceptance although it limited acceptance to terms of purchase order; the seller's
terms in the offer prevailed); Jorgenson, 540 P.2d at 981-82 (purchase order sent in response
to two written quotations deemed to be manifestation of intent to accept seller's offer in all
its essential terms). In particular, see Phillips Petroleum, discussed infra note 225.
225. 741 F.2d 1569 (10th Cir. 1984).
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strued the seller's proposal, which contained a one year statute of
limitations provision, as an offer and the buyer's purchase order as
an acceptance. The purchase order acceptance contained a general
statement reserving all rights and remedies available at law. The
court held that this general reservation impliedly reserved the
Code's limitation period of four years. General statements reserv-
ing U.C.C. protection, however, typically are inserted in printed
forms to avoid interpretations of express clauses that otherwise
may diminish unwittingly the protection buyers automatically en-
joy under the Code. If the purchase order had contained no ex-
press statement concerning warranties or remedies, would not
these terms be implied in it? Certainly, the purchase order func-
tioning as an offer would be said to contain these terms. As the
Daitom opinion recognizes, the purchase order in that case, like
purchase orders generally, was "drafted principally as an offer in-
viting acceptance. '2 6 Why should a form impliedly contain the
usual U.C.C. warranty, remedy, and other buyer protection terms
when it is characterized as an offer, but not contain the identical
implied terms when it is characterized as an acceptance?2 27 In
226. Id. at 1576 (emphasis in original).
227. In Jorgenson, 540 P.2d at 981-82, provisions in the seller's form limiting remedies
and warranties were held to have been accepted by the silent buyer's form. While Jorgenson
simply assumes that when a purchase order is construed as an acceptance it contains no
implied terms, Phillips Petroleum Co., Norway v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 125 Wis. 2d 418, 373
N.W.2d 65, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1192 (Ct. App. 1985), at the time it was de-
cided, apparently removed any doubt that the Jorgenson assumption will be followed. Pro-
posals from the seller in Phillips Petroleum were deemed to be offers. The buyer sent
purchase orders containing conspicuous statements that read, "This order expressly limits
acceptance to the terms stated herein. Purchaser objects to any additional or different terms
of the seller." It is clear that the buyer sought to take advantage of 2-207(2)(a) and (c) by
limiting acceptance to the terms of the purchase order and notifying the vendor of objec-
tions to any different or additional terms in the vendor's form. Had the purchase order been
construed as an offer, the notations on the forms would have been sufficient to give the
buyer the protection afforded by 2-207(a) and (c). Because the purchase orders were con-
strued as acceptances, however, these limitations were not sufficient to convert the purchase
order-acceptance into a counter-offer because the court held the notations insufficient to
meet the "expressly conditional" proviso language of 2-207(1). With respect to the incorpo-
ration of implied terms, the court was particularly clear that the purchase order included no
such implied terms:
We begin with a determination of whether Phillips' purchase order set forth addi-
tional or different terms. The language of the stamped portion stated that "[t]his order
expressly limits acceptance to the terms stated herein." The purchase order nowhere
mentions warranty or liability terms. The purchase order at best is silent as to war-
ranty and liability. The trial court erred in reading these terms into the purchase order.
A court cannot deduce from a party's silence that certain terms are implied. Silence is
not an effective rejection or counteroffer (citing Jorgensen at 983). Where a crucial
term is found in the offer and the acceptance is silent on that term, the terms of the
1368
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Comment 4 to 2-207, heading the list of clauses illustrating mate-
rial alterations is "a clause negating such standard warranties as
that of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose in cir-
cumstances in which either warranty normally attaches." 28 This
language contemplates the inclusion of the usual implied warran-
ties in an offer from a buyer and the express disclaimer of such
warranties in the acknowledgment, which, nonetheless, is a definite
expression of acceptance. To pursue their "knockout" and "fall
out" views, White and Summers must ignore Comment 4.
Whether one agrees with White, Summers, or those who would
include "different" along with "additional" in 2-207(2), it is absurd
to include implied terms in a purchase order functioning as an of-
fer and to exclude the same terms in the same purchase order
when it is construed as an acceptance. Characterizing a purchase
order as an offer or an acceptance has little or nothing to do with a
offer control (citing Jorgenson and J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 31). The
purchase order merely attempted to limit the contract solely to the terms of the
purchase order. Such an attempt would be effective in an offer but has no effect in an
acceptance.
Phillips, 373 N.W.2d at 69. This case is the clearest illustration of a court implying stan-
dardized Code terms in a purchase order form when it is characterized as an offer, but
expressly refusing to imply the same terms in the identical form when it is characterized as
an acceptance. In an opinion rendered on June 23, 1986, however, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeal's decision because it found that the contract had been
modified, creating an express warranty that a certain grade of steel would be used in manu-
facturing crane adapters. The court avoided any discussion by the § 2-207 analysis:
We conclude, whatever Byzantine complexities the original exchange of contract docu-
ments might pose, that a rather simple straight-forward modified contract arose during
the course of negotiations that specifically detailed the obligations of the seller to con-
form to exact specifications set by the buyer. . . . [W]hatever the prior state of the
contract may have been .... the contract after September 27, 1971, contained, as a
modification of the original contract, an express warranty....
Phillips Petroleum Co., Norway v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 1 U.C.C. Rep. 2d 667, 673, 674 (Wis.
Sup. Ct. 1986).
In Idaho Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 569 F.2d 924, 925 (9th Cir. 1979), a
seller's quotation contained a limitation of liability. The buyer's purchase order did not deal
with liability expressly, but did contain the following clause: "acceptance of this order shall
be deemed to constitute an agreement upon the part of the seller to the conditions named
hereon and supersedes all previous agreements." The court held that this statement in the
purchase order was not sufficient to make the acceptance expressly conditional on assent to
additional terms. The court also held that the purchase order did not contest the seller's
disclaimer of liability. The purchase order was a definite and seasonable expression of ac-
ceptance and the limitation of liability in the seller's form was a term of the contract. If the
purchase order had been an offer, it impliedly would have contained the normal remedies
pursuant to the standardized provisions of Article 2. The limitation of liability in the seller's
form would have been excised as a material alteration under 2-207(2)(b). See supra text
accompanying notes 192-96.
228. U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 4 (1977).
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merchant-buyer's conscious use of that form. Rather, the charac-
terization is a judicial afterthought,2 9 which hardly explains why
229. In Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel Co. v. Cal-Cut Pipe & Supply Inc., 98 Idaho 495,
567 P.2d 1246, 1253-54, 22 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 25, 30 (1977), appeal dismissed,
434 U.S. 105 (1978), The court stated:
Cal-Cut makes the argument that since its document was the offer, Southern
Idaho's expression of acceptance was an acceptance of all the terms on this form, in-
cluding the October 15th delivery date. Under this argument, the first party to a sales
transaction will always get his own terms. In most commercial transactions, which
party processes its form first is purely fortuitous. To allow the contents of a contract
to be determined on this basis runs contrary to the underlying purposes of the Uni-
form Commercial Code of modernizing the law governing commercial transac-
tions. . . .We cannot accept such an arbitrary solution." (emphasis added).
See also McCarty v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 89 Ill. App. 3d 498, 411 N.E.2d 936, 30
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 440 (1980).
This analysis has been criticized:
What is this gibberish about the "fortuity" of being first which is anathema "to the
underlying purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code of modernizing the law gov-
erning commercial transactions?" The Code would not have stood the chance for pas-
sage of the proverbial snowball in hell had the legal profession been instructed that it
was intended to jettison so fundamental a legal principle as that which for centuries
has given to offerors the right to fashion the basis of their sanctionable bargains.
Duesenbefg, supra note 5, at 1485. This criticism seems to be so preoccupied with the
vested notion that the offeror is master of his offer that it fails to respond to the court's
assertion that, in an exchange of printed forms, which party processes its form first is purely
fortuitous. Mr. Duesenberg is content to label this assertion, "gibberish." Is it "gibberish,"
however, to consider scores of cases that deal with the fundamental question of whether a
price quotation from a seller, which typically includes terms favorable to a seller, is an offer
rather than a mere preliminary negotiation? Moreover, is it "gibberish" to point to cases
that have held the seller's quotation controlling simply because it was the first operative
document exchanged, thereby making the same disclaimers and exclusions operative that
would have been inoperative had the form been viewed as a preliminary statement of terms?
The typical professional buyer has no understanding of the difference between quotations
that are offers and quotations that are not offers and proceeds to use the only piece of paper
available to him or her-the purchase order-in the same fashion regardless of prior quota-
tions. See supra notes 47 and 162. Furthermore, the vendor has no understanding of
whether his quotation amounts to an offer. A sophisticated understanding of the current
2-207 case law would suggest that a printed vendor's form should be framed in terms of an
offer. Yet many seller's forms list all the usual terms favorable to the vendor, but then
include a clause indicating that acceptance must be approved at the vendor's office, thereby
.permitting the purchase order sent in response to the quotation to be the offer-the control-
ling document. See also Baird & Weisberg, supra note 5, at 1221, 1246, who suggest that:
[T]he drafters [of the Code] sought to break dramatically with traditional formal rules
of offer and acceptance .... [However], it appears that 2-207 has substituted a first-
shot rule for the common law's last shot rule. . . .[S]uch an approach is inconsistent
with the idea that battles of the forms should be treated like cases in which parties
have agreed in principle to do business with one another, but have remained silent as
to some of the terms of the transaction.
Baird and Weisberg later argue that courts have not succumbed to the first-shot rule
suggested by the language of 2-207. Id. at 1247. They suggest that courts avoid the evil of
the first-shot approach in two ways as follows: (a) by the insertion of "expressly conditional"
language in the acceptance, and (b) absent expressly conditional language, they suggest that
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the buyer's terms should prevail in one case, when the purchase
order is deemed an offer, and the seller's terms should prevail in
the case when the same purchase order is characterized as an ac-
ceptance. To overcome this obstacle, drafters of printed forms will
do what they always do. They will add more protective clauses to
reflect any advantage they discern from the confusing case law, al-
though neither buyer nor seller will have the foggiest notion of the
purpose or effect of these clauses.2 30  Eventually, drafters of
purchase order forms may arrive at the "winning form." Consider a
purchase order that contains the following clause:
This purchase order may be construed as an offer, an acceptance of an offer,
or a confirmation of a contract. In the event this purchase order is construed
as an offer, the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer and
constitutes notice of objection to any additional or different terms in the ac-
ceptance so as to preclude the inclusion of any different or additional terms
in any resulting contract. If this purchase order is construed as an accept-
ance, this acceptance expressly conditions such acceptance on the seller's as-
sent to any additional or different terms contained herein. If this purchase
order is construed as a confirmation of an existing contract, such confirma-
tion is expressly conditioned on seller's assent to any additional or different
terms contained herein. All sections of the Uniform Commercial Code which
expressly or impliedly protect the buyer are hereby incorporated by reference
in this form whether it be construed as an offer, an acceptance, or a
the buyer's form is typically first and, therefore, is the offer which controls. If the response
to the offer contains a statutory proviso clause from 2-207(1), it is a counter-offer (to the
surprise of the buyer-offeror), and, for reasons suggested in the analysis of the counter-offer
riddle, the acceptance of the goods will not be an acceptance of the counter-offer. See supra
notes 101-16 and accompanying text. A contract, however, will be formed by conduct under
2-207(3) and will include Code terms favorable to the buyer. Baird & Weisberg, supra note
5, at 1247-48. This rationale limps badly because it is predicated upon a totally unsound
analysis of what constitutes a counter-offer. Moreover, with respect to the situation in which
the acceptance does not contain expressly conditional language, the authors are content to
find no cause for concern because the purchase order is typically the offer. Suppose it is not
the offer, however, but is construed as an acceptance? The authors do note at least one
exception, Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Constr., Inc., 56 Hawaii 466, 468-70, 540 P.2d 978,
981 (1975), in which the seller won the battle of the forms under the first-shot principle.
The case law reaching similar results continues to grow. See supra note 227.
If the seller's form containing the usual disclaimers and exclusions is the offer and the
typical purchase order sent in response is silent, even Professors White and Summers agree
that the terms of the offer control. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. Professor
White would pursue the "more bold" "knockout" view only if the purchase order contained
expressly "different" terms. The only extant case taking that position is Daitom, 741 F.2d at
1569 (10th Cir. 1984), which construed the purchase order as an acceptance and found ex-
pressly different terms in the purchase order's general reservation of Code rights. That anal-
ysis, however, suffers from the fundamental error of insisting that 2-207(2) should not in-
clude "different" terms. See supra text accompanying notes 200-219. In those courts that
insist upon "different" being read into 2-207(2), the different terms in the purchase order-
acceptance, even if implied, would be excised as material alterations under 2-207(2)(b).
230. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
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confirmation.
As an offer, this purchase order would take advantage of 2-
207(2)(a) and (2)(c) by eliminating immaterial, as well as material,
terms in the response that are different or additional terms. As an
acceptance, it would take advantage of the statutory proviso
counter-offer with the hope that the seller would ship the goods,
causing a contract favoring the buyer pursuant to existing case law
to be formed under 2-207(3). Using the form as a confirmation also
would take advantage of the statutory proviso language because
confirmations typically are treated as acceptances for the purpose
of analysis under 2-207.231 In the current 2-207 environment, we
can only speculate whether courts would view this purchase order
language as the doomsday weapon or "the form that always wins"
in the battle of the forms. Current case law suggests it has at least
a chance to be the form that always wins. That this scenario is
plausible is itself a travesty. It is the consummate elevation of form
over substance and, in terms of the purpose of 2-207, stands that
section on its head. A radical transformation of 2-207 is essential if
we are to avoid the apotheosis of form and the consequent possibil-
ity that the offeror always wins.
VII. DENOUEMENT
To achieve some resolution of the puzzles surrounding 2-207,
it is important to return to the underlying philosophy of Article 2
and, in particular, 2-207.232 We should also be mindful of the
troubled Professor White, who suggests that applying his "knock-
out" view and then implying terms under 2-207(3) that favor the
buyer may result in a "hard" case, which he nonetheless accepts
because at least it has the merit of being fair.233 In examining the
underlying philosophy of Article 2 in the context of 2-207, we may
discover serendipitously what is actually bothering Professor
White.
Recall that the simple purpose of 2-207, in its primitive state,
was to change the assumption that variant terms in the response to
an offer necessarily constitute a counter-offer to the assumption
that a response to an offer is an acceptance unless a reasonable
offeror would understand it to be a counter-offer.23 4 This purpose
231. See Murray, Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 5.
232. See supra notes 52-67 and accompanying text.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 193-96.
234. Undoubtedly, the insertion of a statutory proviso clause tracking 2-207(1) in the
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is noble and clearly consistent with the underlying philosophy of
Article 2. Using traditional offer and acceptance mechanisms in
pursuit of this purpose, however, precludes ultimate fidelity to the
identification of the parties' factual bargain as the recognized con-
tract under Article 2. The expulsion of technical constraints
throughout Article 2 to arrive at the factual bargain suggests a de-
sign that is wary of any constraint that could interfere with this
fundamental purpose. A specific assumption in 2-207 is that the
parties do not read, much less understand, the printed terms of
their exchanged writings. These writings typically are designed by
their drafters to use the latest weaponry in a surreptitious fashion
to win the battle of the forms.2 3 5 An arms buildup in 2-207 already
has resulted in great harm to the social institution of contract. Be-
cause innumerable contracts now are formed only by conduct, not-
withstanding the prior exchange of printed forms, we may have
taken the first, retrogressive step toward a primitive barter society.
Unfortunately, it now appears too late to expect a change to occur
in the common-law tradition by radically new and different inter-
pretations and applications of the statutory language. The un-
wieldy precedent contains too many shackles. Even without the
precedent, however, because 2-207 is framed in terms of offer and
acceptance and because we now insist that the section do more
than Karl Llewellyn ever contemplated, revising the statutory lan-
gauge appears to be the only solution. Suggesting particular statu-
tory language would be premature. Instead, we must begin to em-
phasize the underlying philosophy of Article 2 before it will be
possible to recast the language of 2-207 in a form that is totally
consistent with that underlying philosophy.
We must first consider the normative assumptions of Article 2.
It is anything but novel to suggest that broad assumptions like
good faith 36 and conscionability23 7 pervade Article 2. Perceiving
the more specific normative assumptions, however, is unusual.
response to an offer is not intended to communicate effectively an intention to make a
counter-offer. Rather, it clearly illustrates the draftsman inserting a clause that his own
client will not understand and that his client will rely on only if the circumstances require
that weapon to be used. As suggested earlier in this Article, courts have recognized that the
clause "injects ambiguity" into the response to the offer. See supra text accompanying note
125.
235. U.C.C. § 2-207 comment 1 (1977). "Because the forms are oriented to the think-
ing of the respective drafting parties, the terms contained in them often do not correspond
... [nievertheless, the parties proceed with the transaction." Id.
236. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), and 2-103(1)(b) (1977).
237. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977).
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They are so obvious that they tend to be ignored. The normal con-
tract or deal under Article 2 includes express and implied warran-
ties and all judicial remedies to protect the fundamental expecta-
tion interests of the parties. In effect, Article 2 provides the
normal, standardized agreement between the parties. Article 2 "is
in large part a catalogue of the implied terms of contracts of
sale."2 8  The parties need only to manifest an intent to be bound
and to include sufficient detail to permit a court to afford a remedy
in the event of a breach." 9 With an intent to be bound, if the par-
ties can be identified and a quantity term found, all other terms
will be the standardized terms of Article 2.240 In requirements or
output contracts, even the quantity term need not be ascertained
at the moment of formation, if it is ascertainable.241
"[T]he parties' contractual power is now exercised primarily in
specifying deviation from the standardized plan rather than in dd-
fining the obligation ab initio. 2 42 Parties may deviate from the
normative assumptions of Article 2, but deviations from the par-
ties' normal expectations are frowned upon.243 Article 2 specifies
238. See Rakoff, supra note 42, at 1182.
239. U.C.C. § 2-204(3) (1977).
240. The concept that "standardized" terms should be the terms provided by Article 2
is found in the earliest drafts of commentary supporting the Code or its particular sections.
In a report accompanying the 1941 Mimeo Draft Section 1-C, which was to become section
2-302 on unconscionability, a portion of the report was captioned "The Problem of a Semi-
Permanent Code of a Whole Field." Llewellyn suggested two kinds of statutory framework.
The first was an "iron and unyielding" framework to which the parties must adapt. He used
the statute of frauds as an example of this kind of framework. The report continues:
The second kind of framework is a sort of standardized contract, serving wherever the
parties have not particularized their bargain. It fills in and it fills out. Its office is to
provide not only reasonable and fair solutions for particular matters, but, no less, a
whole background of solutions for any matter, which, as a whole is sufficiently reason-
able and fair not to need to be bargained about.
Report accompanying 1941 Proposed Report (Mlimeo Draft), at 21.
241. U.C.C. § 2-306(1) (1977).
242. See Rakoff, supra note 42, at 1182.
243. The original draft dealing with unconscionability is clear on this point. 1941 Pro-
posed Report § 1-C(1)(e) at 16 (Mimeo Draft) states:
The policy of the legislature is also to avoid any seeming portion of a bargain which
does not truly represent bargaining, but under which one party seeks to displace the
rules of this Act, without particular deliberation and bargaining over each clause, in
favor of a set of provisions which lack reasonable balance and fairness in their alloca-
tion of rights and obligations.
A comment to the section is even more persuasive:
The principle of freedom of bargain is a principle of freedom of intended bargain. It
requires what the parties' [sic] have bargained out to stand as the parties have shaped
it, subject only to certain overriding rules of public policy. . ... Displacement of these
balanced backgrounds is not to be assumed as intended unless deliberate intent is
shown that they shall be displaced; and deliberate intent is not shown by a lopsided
1374
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certain formalistic requirements for deviations that are especially
dangerous because they may result in unfair surprise or oppres-
sion. A formal method of disclaiming the implied warranty of
merchantability requires that the written disclaimer use the term
"merchantability" and be conspicuous. 244 This threshold safeguard
helps insure against a court providing operative effect to a surpris-
ing and oppressive term. In keeping with the spirit of Article 2,
some courts have required clauses excluding consequential dam-
ages to be conspicuous. 24 5
The norm is a contract containing all the implied terms of Ar-
ticle 2. If a party seeks to deviate from these normative assump-
tions because that party views the "general" rules as unsatisfac-
form whose very content suggests that it has not been carefully read, and the circum-
stances of whose execution suggest that the matters under discussion and considera-
tion were only the matters written or typed in.
1941 Proposed Report § 1-C comment A(3) at 18-19. (Mimeo Draft) (last emphasis added).
See also infra notes 252-53.
"The code does not imply disclaimers; in fact, disclaimers are not favored by the law.
Thus, [2-207] should not be used to supply the negotiated agreement required for an effec-
tive disclaimer." Hartwig Farms, Inc. v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 28 Wash. App. 539,
544, 625 P.2d 171, 174 (1981).
244. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1977).
245. In Avenell v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Ohio App.2d 150, 324 N.E.2d 583, 16
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 671 (1974), and Insurance Corp. of North America v. Auto-
matic Sprinkler Corp. of America, 67 Ohio 2d 91, 423 N.E.2d 151, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 1595 (1981), the court required a clause excluding consequential damages to be
"conspicuous" as defined in U.C.C. § 1-201(10), notwithstanding the lack of any express re-
quirement of conspicuousness in § 2-719(3) or § 2-316(4). Both cases rely upon the scholar-
ship of Professor Nordstrom, who emphasizes the factual bargain of the parties:
The requirement that the agreement contain the alteration of basic Code remedies
brings into play those ideas discussed in the prior section of this text. The limitations
must be a part of the parties' bargain in fact. If it is contained in a printed clause
which was not conspicuous or brought to the buyer's attention, the seller had no rea-
sonable expectation that the buyer understood that his remedies were being restricted
to repair and replacement. As such, the clause cannot be said to be a part of the bar-
gain (or agreement) of the parties.
R. NORDSTROM, LAW OF SALES 376 (1970); see also Seibel v. Layne & Bowler, Inc., 56 Or.
App. 387, 641 P.2d 668 (1982).
In Schroeder v. Faegol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash.2d 256, 544 P.2d 20, 23-24 18 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 584 (1975), the court considered conspicuousness as a factor in determin-
ing the conscionability of an exclusionary clause. Moreover, the court applied this concept in
a merchant-to-merchant transaction. Cf. Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 105 Idaho
189, 668 P.2d 65, 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 804 (1983) (emphasizing the importance
of bargaining over a limitation of remedy). Several courts have read § 2-719(3) literally, with
no requirement of conspicuousness. See, e.g., Hahn v. Ford Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 943, 948
n. 2, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1277 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Xerox Corp. v. Hawkes,
124 N.H. 610, 475 A.2d 7, 11 (1984); Flintkote Co. v. W. W. Wilkinson, Inc., 220 Va. 571, 260
S.E.2d 229 (1979); Collins Radio Co. of Dallas, Texas v. Bell, 623 P.2d 1039 (Olka. Ct. App.
1980).
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tory,240 that party should have the burden of showing that the
other party to the contract had a reasonable opportunity to under-
stand that any deviant term was proffered as a part of the factual
bargain. Moreover, whether the party who must sustain that bur-
den is the offeror or offeree should make no difference. This sug-
gestion is a substantial extrapolation of the burden on an offeree to
convince the trier of fact that the offeror should have understood
the response to the offer as a counter-offer. It is, however, in the
same tradition of avoiding technical and formalistic constraints
that interfere with and, in some cases, destroy the factual bargain
of the parties. The argument that parties who use standardized
printed forms to manifest their factual bargain should be bound
only by that which they reasonably expect to discover in the un-
read forms regardless of their contents214 is more than merely plau-
sible. Notwithstanding criticisms of Llewellyn's views on conscious
assent to "dickered" terms and "blanket" assent to "decent" un-
dickered terms,248 the underlying concept appears clearly through-
out Article 2. If a disclaimer of warranty or exclusion of remedy
clause is not part of the factual bargain, giving the clause operative
effect is "indecent" because it oppresses and unfairly surprises the
party against whom it operates.
An important consideration is whether deviant terms, albeit
meeting the formalistic safeguards of Article 2, become part of the
contract ab initio. If a disclaimer of warranty provision meets the
safeguard requirements of 2-316(2), it is operative if that term is
part of the contract. If no "battle of the forms" occurred because,
for example, the buyer signed the seller's form, the disclaimer
would become part of the contract between merchants absent a
successful attack on unconscionability grounds, which the courts
have been notoriously unwilling to apply in merchant transac-
tions.249 Likewise, the acceptance of a clear counter-offer contain-
246. See supra note 161.
247. See Murray, Standardized Agreement, supra note 9, at 776-77.
248. See, Rakoff, supra note 42, at 1199; see also Slawson, The New Meaning of Con-
tracts: The Transformation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PirT. L. REv. 21,
32-37 (1984).
249. See, e.g., Geldermann and Co. v. Lane Processing, Inc., 527 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.
1975); Royal Indemnity Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
W.L. May Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 273 Or. 701, 543 P.2d 283 (1975); K & C, Inc. v. West-
inghouse Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303, 263 A.2d 390 (1970).
Unconscionability, however, has been successfully used in certain retail dealer contracts
between oil companies and filling station operators. See Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F.
Supp. 264 (E.D. Mich. 1976); Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 63 N.J. 402, 307 A.2d 598 (1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 920 (1974); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 159 W.Va. 463, 223 S.E.2d
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ing a disclaimer of warranty would suggest the inclusion of the dis-
claimer in the resulting contract. If the disclaimer clause in the
counter-offer failed to meet the safeguard requirements of 2-
316(2), however, this failure alone would prevent its being an en-
forceable term of the contract. If the clause did meet the safeguard
requirements, it still would not become part of the contract if the
response to the offer should not have been reasonably understood
as a counter-offer. If the response containing the disclaimer was
reasonably understood as an acceptance, the deviant disclaimer of
warranty clause would not be part of the contract ab initio. A dis-
claimer is a deviation from the normative assumption of Article 2
that buyers are entitled to implied warranty protection. If a
purchase order form contained a clause negating the normal
seller's right to cure a nonconformity after the buyer has rejected
the goods or a clause substantially limiting normal sellers' reme-
dies under Article 2, these clauses would be deviations from the
normative assumptions of Article 2 concerning sellers' rights.
Whether deviant terms become part of the contract should not de-
pend upon whether they appear in the offer or the acceptance.
Absent contrary trade usage or prior course of dealing, which
both necessarily affect the factual bargain of the parties, 50 the
normal deal between merchants must be based on the assumptions
of Article 2-express and implied warranties, buyer and seller rem-
edies, statute of limitations, reasonable time, place, and manner of
performance, and other normative assumptions. The resulting con-
tract is the normal factual bargain. A cogent example of the em-
phasis upon the factual bargain is found in the new express war-
ranty concept that eschews a reliance requirement25' and assumes
that the seller has the burden of showing that a particular state-
ment did not become an express warranty. Comment 8 to 2-313
expresses this new concept. "What statements of the seller have in
the circumstances and in objective judgment become part of the
433 (1976); Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971). Professors
White and Summers suggest that cases such as Johnson may not "signify a trend....
Nonetheless, one moral of these cases is that when a businessman is poorly educated, 'over a
barrel', or is the victim of fine print, a court may invalidate a clause that otherwise would
stand up between ordinary businessmen." J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 171-72.
250. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1977) defines agreement as "the bargain of the parties in fact
as found in their language or by implication from other circumstances including course of
dealing or usage of trade or course of performance."
251. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1977) comment 3 ("No particular reliance on such statements
need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement."); see also Murray,
Basis of the Bargain: Transcending Classical Concepts, 66 MINN. L. REv. 283, 284 (1982).
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basis of the bargain? As indicated above, all of the statements of
the seller do so unless good reason is shown to the contrary.
2 52
In essence, Comment 8 asks: What assumptions of Article 2
should become part of the basis of the bargain? All assumptions
should become part of the basis of the bargain unless good reason
is shown to the contrary. This analysis also suggests what in fact
bothers Professor White. Professor White is willing to apply the
"knockout" view to conflicting express terms and to insert terms
implied under Article 2 because the implied terms exude fairness.
On the other hand, he is troubled by a conclusion he feels is ines-
capable: an "unfair" term will be included in the contract if it ap-
pears in what is later judicially determined to have been the offer,
rather than in an acceptance that does not expressly contradict the
parallel term in the offer. Professor White discovers no statutory
or other basis for overcoming this inconsistency, but the inconsis-
tency sticks in his craw as being unfair.25 3 It should stick, because
it is unfair. Professor White has no escape because the statutory
language is framed in terms of offer and acceptance. Escaping this
unfair inconsistency requires more than an artistic reading of the
existing language; it requires substantial statutory revision. The
language of offer and acceptance in 2-207 must be eliminated.254
The new language of 2-207 must reflect the following principle:
The burden of establishing the inclusion of a term that deviates
from a normative assumption of Article 2 must be placed upon the
party whose document seeks to impose the deviant term on a party
against whom the term will operate if it becomes part of the con-
tract. That burden should include a clear demonstration that the
other party should have reasonably understood the deviation from
normative assumptions as becoming part of the contract.255 A
252. U.C.C. § 2-313 comment 8 (1977) (emphasis added).
253. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 31.
254. The only extant opinion manifesting a clear understanding of this concept is
Steiner v. Mobil Oil Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 90, 141 Cal. Rptr. 157, 569 P.2d 751, 758, 22 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 865 (1977). In Steiner the court stated:
Instead of fastening upon abstract doctrinal concepts like offer and acceptance, section
2-207 looks to the actual dealings of the parties and gives legal effect to that con-
duct. . . . Section 2-207 requires courts to put aside the formal and academic stereo-
types of traditional doctrine [sic] of offer and acceptance and to analyze instead what
really happens.
255. The original draft of what was to become the section on unconscionability,
§ 2-302, was unusually long (ninety-nine lines) and was accompanied by five pages of com-
mentary and a report that devoted another four pages to explicating the section, then num-
bered section 1-C. 1941 Proposed Report § 1-C (Mimeo Draft). Two parts of this draft pro-
vide ample support for this Article's concept concerning the burden of establishing
[Vol. 39:13071378
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party who succeeds in this demonstration would convince a court
to change the normal Code standard because the party has shown
a "good reason to the contrary."2 ' In the normal situation involv-
ing a purchase order offer, the offeror would have to communicate
any deviant terms in the offer in such clear fashion that a reasona-
ble offeree would understand the deviation as part of the offer.
Under this analysis, a typical printed clause containing an arbitra-
tion term or any other material change in normal sellers' rights
under Article 2 would be inoperative. The identical analysis would
apply to a seller's printed "quotation" that is deemed to be an of-
deviation. Section 1-C(1)(b) emphasized that any deviation from the terms of the Code
must be desired by both parties.
When both of the parties have so directed their attention to a particular point that...
variance from this Act may fairly be regarded as the deliberate desire of both, and as
reflecting a considered bargain on that particular point . . . the legislature recognizes
that policy in general requires the parties' particular bargain to control.
Id.; see also, § I-C Comment A(3) (quoted supra in note 243. In addition to showing that
both parties deliberately desired the deviation, the party seeking to enforce a particular
deviation must establish that the deviations have been understood and agreed to. Section 1-
C(2)(a)(i) leaves no doubt as to which party has this burden:
If the bloc [of form clauses] as a whole is shown affirmatively to work a displacement or
modification of the provisions of this Act in an unfair and unbalanced fashion not re-
quired by the circumstances of the trade, then the party claiming application of any
particular provision in such bloc must show that the other party, with due knowledge
of the contents of that particular provision, intended that provision to displace or
modify the relevant provision of this Act in regard to the particular transaction (em-
phasis added).
The private law that a contract creates will be recognized as legally binding only if it
conforms to some rational standard. The classic standard of contract enforceability is the
manifestation of volition or free choice-the essence of agreement. As Professor Slawson
suggests, "the 'government' it creates is by its nature 'government by and with the consent
of the governed.'" Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmak-
ing Power, 84 HARv. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971). Equally important is the necessity for a society
espousing freedom of contract to insist upon communication of the terms of the contract.
"'[A] regime of contract could hardly function if the terms of an agreement were affected by
an uncommunicated intention of one of the parties.' The exercise of individual choice is
necessary to maintain one of the critical foundations of social order: organization by reci-
procity. It is essential that courts establish effective rules for the operation of a society with
divergent objectives." Murray, Standardized Agreement, supra note 9, at 741 (quoting
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication (November 19, 1957) (unpublished paper),
reprinted in H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 421, 424 (1958) (unpublished manuscript)).
256. See supra note 234. A comment to the original draft on unconscionability (now
§ 2-302, but then numbered § 1-C) is instructive:
The true principle is clear enough: the expression of a body of fair and balanced usage
is a great convenience, a gain in clarity and certainty, an overcoming of the difficulty
faced by the law in regulating the multitude of different trades; on the other hand, the
substitution of private rule-making by the party, in his own interest, for the balance
provided by the law is not to be recognized without strong reason shown.
1941 Proposed Report § 1-C comment A(5), at 19 (Mimeo Draft) (last emphasis added).
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fer. The seller would have the burden of establishing that the
buyer-offeree reasonably understood the deviant terms. A seller's
acknowledgment form containing the printed disclaimers of war-
ranties, exclusions of normal Article 2 remedies, arbitration terms,
or other material deviations would also be subject to an identical
analysis. In that case, the result coincidentally would be identical
to the results obtained under current interpretations of 2-207 re-
garding sellers' acknowledgments.
Thus, the new analysis simply would apply the same assump-
tions concerning unread, printed, deviant clauses to offers as well
as acceptances. That the current interpretation of 2-207 assumes
no duty to read or understand deviant terms in the response to an
offer, but blithely assumes a duty to read and understand deviant
terms in the offer bears emphasis. If an offeror has no duty to read
or understand deviant terms in the response, why does he have a
duty to read and understand the same deviant terms when a court
deems him to be an offeree? This indefensible posture is the un-
witting product of the vested notion that a party has a duty to
read and understand any document to which he may be said to
have manifested agreement. Yet "[t]his 'duty' can just as well be
viewed as a refusal to impose any duty on the drafting party to
ascertain whether form terms are known and understood. 2 57
The new analysis would refuse operative effect to any printed
clause that a reasonable merchant would not read or understand as
part of the deal. Neither party would be surprised unfairly or op-
pressed. Printed clauses that seek to take advantage of certain
statutory language with no regard for the other party's reasonable
understanding, like the "form that always wins" or a statutory pro-
viso counter-offer, would be inoperative. Not only are these clauses
unlikely to be read or understood by a reasonable merchant; they
are obviously designed to win the battle of the forms surrepeti-
tiously. Their purpose is not to establish a clear understanding of
the terms upon which either party seeks to contract, but to insure
that one party prevails in any dispute over terms. This perspective
serves to illuminate further the appropriate test. A court should
consider whether the party seeking to insert deviant terms appar-
ently intended the other party to understand them, rather than
cleverly having included the terms to win the battle. This inquiry
would assist the court to determine whether the deviant terms
were communicated so clearly that a manifestation of assent
257. Rakoff, supra note 42, at 1187.
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should make them operative.
The proposed analysis accurately reflects the underlying phi-
losophy of Article 2. It is the only analysis that is faithful to the
factual bargain of the parties, thereby negating oppression and un-
fair surprise. Recent scholarship that suggests a rejection of that
underlying philosophy and the substitution of a more formalistic
approach does not argue with the "principled analysis." Presuma-
bly, the scholarship would not argue with an extrapolation of that
analysis that would espouse even greater fidelity to the factual bar-
gain.2 5 s The scholarship rejecting the principled analysis reflects
258. Baird and Weisberg distinguish the two following approaches to the problems of
2-207 and other Article 2 questions: (a) the "Open Standards" approach and (b) the "For-
mal Rules" approach. The "Open Standards" approach is characterized as one in which
"[c]ourts and legislatures ... create very general criteria that leave judges broad power to
examine the circumstances of particular cases-to see whether the parties indeed struck a
bargain and to identify the terms on which the parties' minds met." Baird & Weisberg,
supra note 5, at 1227. The "Formal Rules" approach seeks to avoid the "uncertainty about
the likely outcome of contract cases [which might] discourage people from entering into
transactions. Lawmakers therefore might prefer to create formal rules of contract formation,
and the courts might enforce these rules rigidly." Id. The authors admit that 2-207 and
Article 2 generally adopt the "Open Standards" approach. "The drafters sought to treat the
battle of the forms with an open-textured 'standard' similar to the one they applied to an-
other recurrent problem in contract formation-the case where the parties have unquestion-
ably contracted but have left some of the terms of their agreement incomplete." Id. at 1221.
The authors describe my analysis as follows:
Dean Murray has been perhaps the most ardent proponent of the view that Article 2
generally favors the "standards" approach. The Code, he stresses, eschews formal rules
that focus on the precise language of the parties' documents. Instead, it invites and
requires courts to look to all available evidence of the parties' intent, including their
course of dealing and the customs of their trade, to cover the essential bargain-in-fact:
"The true bargain in fact must be laid bare because it is deserving of the legally recog-
nized status of a 'contract' between the parties-only the bargain-in-fact should be
made operative by the courts." The true agreement, in this view, is a living organism
subject to growth through modifications of the parties' expression and conduct. The
formal writings are but one stage in the life of the agreement and offer only a partial
description of it: "All of these. . . manifestations of the underlying philosophy of Arti-
cle 2 (and attendant sections of Article 1) manifest the same goal: a more precise and
fair identification of the actual or presumed intent of the parties. Any other goal is
hostile to the nature of intention, bargain and assent. The only other possible route to
fairness is the government administered contract which not only strips the 'agreement'
of individual freedom of choice but well may prove to be unworkable and, therefore,
ultimately fair."
Id. at 1228-29 (quoting Murray, Incipient Unconscionability, supra note 5, at 647, 648-49).
The authors suggest that they agree that the "principled" or, in their terminology, the
"standards" approach is clearly the design of Article 2. "Our point of difference with Dean
Murray is not that the inquiry he thinks courts should engage in is necessarily the wrong
one, but rather that it is a necessarily imprecise one." Baird and Weisberg, supra note 5, at
1219 n.4. They suggest a return to the mirror image rule, which they suggest has been mis-
understood, and a general return to a more formalistic structure. It is appropriate to con-
sider reactions to this position.
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despair in the analysis' application. In effect, this scholarship re-
flects the belief that the great hope of Karl Llewellyn-that the
contract law of Article 2 should eschew technical constraints and
formalism to emphasize the best approximation of the "true un-
derstanding' 259 of the parties-is simply unworkable because our
legislatures and particularly our courts are incapable of achieving
that goal. Adopting formalistic suggestions would not only spell the
end of the purposes of 2-207; it would initiate a severe retrogres-
sion in the judicial progress attained elsewhere in the new contract
law of Article 2.280 It would begin to establish another form of mo-
Professor Travalio offers a comprehensive criticism of the Baird and Weisberg analysis.
See Travalio, supra note 5, at 373-78. He summarizes the analysis as follows:
[T]he mirror image rule will cause offerors to read the fine print on responses received
from offerees, since they are aware that these terms might become part of the contract
if ignored. Knowing offerors will read the fine print on their forms, offerees will not
include one-sided terms for fear of losing the offeror's business. As a result, the terms
actually included on the offerees' forms will generally be fair and acceptable to offerors.
Suitable terms will become part of the contract without a significant increase in negoti-
ation costs.
Id. at 373-74. Professor Travalio emphasizes Baird's and Weisberg's assumption that mod-
ern buyers are generally aware of the fine print terms of sellers' forms. If that assumption is
true, Travalio suggests, sellers' forms are probably already as mutually advantageous as they
are likely to become. Yet, sellers' forms are filled with provisions favoring the seller. If mod-
ern buyers are even more sophisticiated, and not only are aware of the seller's favorable
terms, but are also aware that existing case law will excise those favorable seller's terms and
result in a contract by conduct, sellers have no incentive to include the favorable terms. The
terms will be excised under 2-207(3). Travalio asserts that Baird and Weisberg may be in-
correct in their assumptions that buyers typically are aware of the fine print terms on sell-
ers' forms. He casts doubt on the authors sole empirical study, a British study conducted
when the applicable law was the mirror image rule. See supra note 47. Moreover, he sug-
gests that the premise of 2-207 is that businessmen do not read the fine print on the other
party's form.
Professor Slawson takes issue with a fundamental tenet of the Baird and Weisberg
analysis that suggests that the Code's "gap filler" terms are likely to provide contract terms
that are not in the parties' interest because they will not be the terms chosen by the parties.
Professor Slawson calls this implication false because the Code's "gap fillers" generally are
the terms that the parties have chosen, albeit implicitly." Slawson, supra note 246, at 45.
259. U.C.C. § 2-202 comment 2 (1977).
260. One of the better illustrations of a sophisticated judicial understanding of the
major modifications of contract law appears in Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451
F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971). The opinion evidences a clear understanding of the importance of
trade usage and prior course of dealing in effecting the parties' factual bargain. It suggests a
precocious understanding of the Code parol evidence rule and the necessity of repudiating
the "plain meaning" rule of interpretation. The court is well aware of the anti-technical
nature of Article 2, see supra note 18, and even displays an early sophistication with respect
to 2-207. See also Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 191, 298 N.Y.2d 264, 266
(1969). In Star Credit Corp., the court held that section 2-302, which is designed to prevent
oppression and unfair surprise, "permits a court to accomplish directly what heretofore was
often accomplished by construction of language, manipulations of fluid rules of contract law
and determinations based upon a presumed public policy." Id.
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nistic contract law in which parties are bound by what they sign
regardless of their reasonable understanding of the printed clauses
in the document. It would unearth the "flagellant" theory2 6' that,
once burned by not reading or understanding the document, the
merchant soon would learn not to be burned again. But unlike a
child and a hot stove, a merchant who once finds himself bound to
a clause that any reasonable merchant would not understand still
will not read or understand the thousands of clauses in myriad
printed forms that allegedly reflect the substance of the innumera-
ble deals he makes.
It cannot be gainsaid that the new analysis, which seeks even
greater fidelity to the factual bargain, will continue to require
courts to decide some difficult questions of fact concerning the rea-
sonable understanding of the party receiving a printed form. Judi-
cial empathy for the particular surrounding circumstances is essen-
tial. 2  There must be a continual progression of the understanding
of the relational context between contracting merchants to which
contract law is inexorably moving.2es Courts must observe these
261. The "flagellant" theory of statutory interpretation suggests that a court has the
duty:
to discipline the legislature by taking it literally whenever it forgets to deal with special
cases or otherwise fails to speak clearly. The notion is that if the legislature is firmly
and unvaryingly punished in this way for permitting uncertainty to creep into its en-
actments, pretty soon it will start writing laws which are clear and certain, and the
courts and the people will then be spared the pain of having to think for themselves
about what the laws mean. Almost every law student finds himself attracted to this
view at some stage in his education. Some lawyers, and even judges, never get over the
attraction.
H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW, 99-100 (1958) (unpublished manuscript).
262. See Murray, The Realism of Behaviorism Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
51 OR. L. REV. 269 (1972).
263. Professor Ian R. Macneil has developed a theory of "relational" contracts which
is not served particularly well by either traditional or even neoclassical contract law. Tradi-
tional contract law was designed to establish, as far as possible, the entire relation between
the parties at the time the contract was formed. Macneil refers to this traditional contract
concept as "total presentation;" bringing the future into the present through virtually per-
fect predictability. The dominant characteristic of the typical contract system is to force the
content of the relation between the parties into a pattern of mutual assent expressed at a
particular, instantaneous point in time; the acceptance of the offer. This contract system
may operate effectively with respect to the "discrete transaction"-the contract of short
duration, with limited personal interactions, and with easily measurable objects of ex-
change-goods for money. Macneil, however, believes that few economic exchanges occur in
the discrete transactional pattern. Rather, he believes that virtually all economic exchanges
occur in circumstances involving one or more of the following elements: significant duration
(e.g., franchising), whole person relations (e.g., employment contracts), difficult to measure
objects of exchange (e.g., the projection of personality by an airline stewardess), considera-
ble anticipated future cooperative behavior (e.g., the players and management of a profes-
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standards not only because of the overriding importance of fair-
ness, but because the governing statute, Article 2, commands it. To
those critics who would suggest that the new analysis would be un-
workable because it would preclude the use of printed forms, the
answer is balderdash. We need not return to the days of the green
shade, quill pen, the scroll, and scrivener. Any contracts lawyer
must know that most of the typical printed form is unnecessary or
unfair.264 An effective counter-offer and deviant terms may be
communicated clearly in a printed form. If both sides submit devi-
ant terms communicated in such a fashion that the other merchant
should reasonably understand them, no contract is formed by the
exchanged forms. A subsequent contract by conduct should incor-
porate the normative assumptions of Article 2, because neither
party will have succeeded in showing good reason why it should
not. Again, the terms of the contract by conduct will be fair.
Tinkering with some of the language in 2-207 to avoid further
problems with the counter-offer riddle or the different vs. addi-
tional puzzle will not be sufficient. We must also do something
about the offer-acceptance mechanism that pervades 2-207. We
must scrap 2-207 and begin anew to reflect Article 2's underlying
philosophy so that the new 2-207 may effectively apply to the com-
plex transactions that the great Karl Llewellyn had insufficient
time to envision. The probabilities are overwhelming that Llewel-
lyn would agree. For him, the apotheosis of any statute was its
purpose.2 65 It is time to remember the evils that Article 2 sought to
sional football team), and many other circumstances forming a "relational web." Although
he believes that most contracts should be called "relational," he suggests a spectrum ranging
from the highly discrete transaction to the highly relational contract. See . MACNEIL, THE
NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT (1979); Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Presenta-
tion, 60 VA. L. REV. 589 (1974); Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic
Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV.
854 (1978).
264. At some point, the firm's interest in freeing itself from external constraints begins
to merge with the professional ethos of the legal draftsman. The lawyer drafts to protect the
client from every imaginable contingency. The real needs of the business are left behind; the
standard applied is the latitude permitted by the law. Ultimately, the document becomes
unintelligible even to the normal businessman.
Rakoff, supra note 42, at 1222.
265. "A piece of legislation, like any other rule of law, is, of course, meaningless with-
out reason and purpose." K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE 228 (1962); see also supra note 4.
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avoid 2e and to provide effective, rather than covert, tools to rem-
edy those evils in the battle of the forms.
266. The theory of purposive statutory interpretation can be traced to Heydon's Case,
Exchequer, 1584. 30 Co. 7a, 76 Eng. Rep. 637. The "true interpretation" of a statute was to
be discerned by considering the following four elements: (1) the common law before the
statute; (2) the "mischief" and "defect" not provided for in the common law; (3) the remedy
devised by the legislature to "cure the disease," and (4) the "true reason of the remedy."
The case then directs judges to construe the statute to "suppress the mischief, and advance
the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief,
. . . and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the
makers of the Act, pro bono publico." Reprinted in H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 259, at
1144.
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